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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a new approach to discrete choice analysis for risky prospects. Conventional 
discrete choice analysis focuses on riskless prospects and does not deal with the scenario where the 
alternatives that the decision-makers choose from are associated with risk. In this paper, we investigate 
decision-makers’ risk perception and choice behaviour in choice experiments when they are facing 
several risky prospects. We propose a broad class of cumulative risky weighting functions, upon which 
a unified cumulative risky weighting function is developed. We show that this unified cumulative risky 
weighting function includes several existing cumulative risky weighting functions as special cases. We 
then develop a multivariate method for choice analysis with risky prospects to account for decision-
makers’ individual-specific risk perception and the impact of various factors on the value function 
respectively. We illustrate the developed method using an empirical study on road tolling in Australia. 
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1.   Introduction 
Discrete choice analysis is widely applied to a range of disciplines such as transport, economics, 
marketing, political science, etc. (see, e.g., Hensher et al., 2015; Train, 2009). It investigates decision-
makers’ choice behaviour when they make a choice from several options. Conventional discrete 
choice analysis associated with a fully compensatory choice paradigm focuses on the scenario where 
the choice situations are assumed riskless for choice makers in the sense that the alternatives under 
investigation are completely characterised by a number of deterministic (or given) attributes 
(covariates).  
This papers considers decision-making when decision-makers are facing several risky prospects, 
following along the research line of Prospect Theory (PT) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), Rank 
Dependent Utility model (RDU) (Quiggin, 1982), and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1992). These theories offer an alternative behavioural paradigm to the conventional 
expected utility theory (EUT) (Wakker, 2010; Fehr-Duda and Epper, 2012) for the investigation of 
decision-making under uncertainty. They argue, with a large body of evidence in the literature, that 
when facing uncertainty, decision-makers will transform the given uncertainty measure and utility 
function, prior to decision-making, into their own decision weights and value function.  
Discrete analysis and CPT are mostly investigated separately in the literature. Hensher et al. (2011) 
reviewed the contributions of CPT in transport and other literature and undertook a study to embed 
perceptual conditioning and risk attitude into discrete choice analysis. They investigated, in a stated 
choice setting, individual preferences for two designed routes in Australia with travel time subject to 
risk. The respondents (travellers) in the survey were asked to consider their reference alternative and 
two designed alternatives. Unlike the conventional discrete choice analysis where alternatives are 
characterised by a number of deterministic (or given) attributes, the most distinguished feature of the 
research in Hensher et al. (2011) was that the alternatives shown to the respondents during the survey 
were under risk and described by a probability distribution, and hence the analysis in Hensher et al. 
(2011) was based on the respondents’ perceived travel time. Gao et al. (2010), on the other hand, 
developed a routing policy choice model based on CPT. They investigated a scenario where travellers 
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know the probabilistic distributions of the link travel times, leading to a route choice problem under 
risk. They also compared differences between models based on EUT and CPT. Their study 
demonstrates the flexibility of the CPT models to represent varying degrees of risk aversion and risk 
seeking depending on the outcome probabilities. In addition to Hensher et al. (2011) and Gao et al. 
(2010), some other studies in the transportation and traffic studies literature investigated travellers’ 
choice behaviour with risky prospects. For example, Xu et al. (2011) investigated modelling 
traveller’s route choice behaviour based on CPT.  Li and Hensher (2013) investigated behavioural 
implications of preferences, risk attitudes and beliefs in modelling risky travel choice with travel time 
variability. Kemel and Paraschiv (2013) applied PT to investigate joint time and money consequences 
in risk and ambiguity of transport users. De Palma et al. (2008) provided a general overview on choice 
analysis for both EUT and non-EUT approaches. Hu et al. (2012), on the other hand, investigated a 
comparison of EUT and non-EUT approaches in the context of modelling travellers’ risky choice, and 
De Palma et al. (2015) reviewed various studies on risk and uncertainty in urban and transport 
economics. 
The purpose of this paper is to generalise the approaches investigated in Hensher et al. (2011) and 
Gao et al. (2010).  We aim to investigate the risky weighting problem in a general context so that the 
methodology developed in this paper can be applied to a wide range of problems of behaviour under 
risk, including travel behaviour and route choice. We contribute to the literature by developing a 
simultaneous modelling method for both decision-makers’ risk perception and choice behaviour when 
decision-makers choose from several risky prospects. We propose a unified method for elicitation of 
decision-makers’ risk perception. In the literature, there are several widely used risky weighting 
functional forms, including Goldstein and Einhorn (1987), Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Wu and 
Gonzalez (1996), and Prelec (1998).  It is not yet clear, from a theoretical perspective, how these risky 
functions are related to each other and in which particular circumstance we should choose one from 
several candidate functions. We examine these commonly used risky weighting functions in the 
literature, upon which we propose a broad class of cumulative risky weighting functions (CRWFs) for 
the modelling of decision-makers’ risky weighting behaviour. We then investigate some important 
4 
 
theoretical characteristics of risky weighting and how these risky weighting functions are related to 
each other.  
On the basis of the proposed CRWFs, we develop a multivariate approach to describing decision-
makers’ choice behaviour when choice situations are subject to risk. We consider the case of 
stochastic value functions in CPT, and capture the relationship between choice outcomes and the 
attributes of decision-makers and prospects under the framework of discrete choice analysis.  
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we propose a broad class of CRWFs. We then 
consider some important properties of risky weighting and develop a unified CRWF. In Section 3 we 
investigate a multivariate method for choice analysis with risky prospects. The elicitation of the risky 
weighting function and the value function will be discussed in Section 4. The proposed method is 
illustrated using a practical example in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we summarise the main 
contributions of this paper. All the proofs of theorems are presented in Appendix A. In Appendix B we 
discuss the maximum entropy principle.  
 
2.   Cumulative risky weighting functions  
In this section, we focus on decision-makers’ risky weighting and propose a general approach to 
the specification of the CRWF. 
 
2.1.   Expected utility theory and cumulative prospect theory   
We briefly summarise EUT and CPT in this subsection. Consider a typical decision-making 
problem where there are a number of (say 𝐽𝐽 ) states of nature, each having a probability 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0 
( 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽) with ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 = 1. Each decision-maker 𝑛𝑛 (𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁) needs to choose a prospect from 
a choice set 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 of size 𝑀𝑀, where each prospect 𝑖𝑖 is defined to be a contract (gamble): 
 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 = ��𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗�𝑗𝑗=1𝐽𝐽 , �𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝑗𝑗=1𝐽𝐽 �      for 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑀𝑀, 
associated with the primary outcome (payoff) variable 𝑇𝑇 that takes a value of  𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 with probability 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗.  
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Let 𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡; 𝜇𝜇�, ?̃?𝜏) denote the utility function of a decision-maker with risk attitude coefficient ?̃?𝜏 and 
individual-specific parameter 𝜇𝜇�.  For decision-maker 𝑛𝑛 choosing prospect 𝑖𝑖, the expected utility 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 is 
defined to be 
 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = ∑ 𝑢𝑢�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗; 𝜇𝜇�𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛, ?̃?𝜏�𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 ,        (1) 
where 𝜇𝜇�𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 is the individual-specific parameter of the utility function for decision-maker 𝑛𝑛 choosing 
prospect 𝑖𝑖.  The most dominant normative and descriptive model of decision making under uncertainty 
in the conventional decision-making theory is EUT. In EUT, a decision-maker chooses a prospect 𝑖𝑖 if 
and only if  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ≥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 {𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛}, i.e., his/her expected utility attains the maximum when choosing 
prospect 𝑖𝑖 (see, e.g., Wakker, 2010). 
Allais (1953), however, considered a decision-making problem consisting of two choice situations 
(denoted as A and B), each with two prospects (gambles). Allais (1953) found that the choice 
behaviour of the same person across a series of choice situations was often inconsistent with EUT, 
now known as the Allais paradox.  
Since the study of Allais (1953), there has been a large body of empirical evidence in the literature 
in relation to the Allais paradox, and considerable effort has been made to try to resolve the Allais 
paradox. In particular, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory, which was 
subsequently modified to become a more general theory, known as cumulative prospect theory (CPT), 
in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). It is argued in CPT that, when facing uncertainty in reality, each 
decision-maker will transform the given uncertainty measure and his/her utility function prior to the 
decision making. Specifically, let 𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡; 𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏) denote the value function with risk attitude coefficient 𝜏𝜏 
and an individual-specific parameter 𝜇𝜇, and 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝1, … ,𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽) denote the risky weighting function that 
transforms probability 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ( 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽) into the decision-maker’s “decision weight” (probability) 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗: 
 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝1, … ,𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽).          (2) 
The expected value 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 after the risk perception transformation in CPT is: 
 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = ∑ 𝑣𝑣�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗; 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛, 𝜏𝜏�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 ,        (3) 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛  is the individual-specific parameter of the value function for decision-maker 𝑛𝑛 choosing 
prospect 𝑖𝑖.   
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In the literature, there is in general a consensus that the two components in equation (3), i.e., the 
value function 𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡;𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏)  and the risky weighting function 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝1, … ,𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽) , must satisfy some 
desired behavioural properties. For example, the value function is usually assumed to be concave for 
gains and convex for losses; a risky weighting function 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝1, … ,𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽) overweights small tail 
probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Abdellaoui et al. 2010). This allows the researcher 
considerable flexibility in modelling. In empirical analysis, however, because there is little guidance 
on the choice of the value function and risky weighting function, the researcher usually has to explore 
a number functional forms (see, e.g., Stott, 2006; Hensher et al., 2011, Balcombe & Fraser, 2015), 
aiming to find a suitable choice of value function 𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡; 𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏)  and risky weighting function 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 =
𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝1, … ,𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽) that performs best numerically. For example, Stott (2006) and Balcombe & Fraser (2015) 
examined 256 and 549 variants constructed from these functions respectively.  
 
2.2.   CRWFs and primary outcome transformations 
We now focus on the risky weighting function in equation (2). Following the assumption in the 
previous subsection, each prospect is characterised by a random primary outcome variable 𝑇𝑇  (e.g., 
travel time of a journey) with a reference point of zero and a probabilistic measure 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = Pr (𝑇𝑇 > 𝑡𝑡) 
(which is usually termed survival function in the event-to-time analysis, describing the likelihood that 
the primary outcome exceeds a particular level 𝑡𝑡).  
In real-world decision-making problems, the primary outcome variable 𝑇𝑇 can be of various data 
formats. In Tversky and Kahneman (1992), they confine their investigation to monetary outcomes, and 
hence the support of the variable is the entire real line (denoted by ℜ). In this paper, we restrict our 
interest to the situation that the primary outcome variable 𝑇𝑇 has the support of all nonnegative real 
values (denoted by ℜ+);  this appears to line up well with the design of attribute levels in many choice 
experiments in transportation research. We will briefly discuss the scenario of 𝑇𝑇 ∈ ℜ at the end of this 
section.  
In many choice experiments, the continuous primary outcome variable 𝑇𝑇 is often discretised and 
expressed as a number of outcomes, each corresponding to a state of nature with probability 
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representing the chance that the state will occur, i.e. (𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗,𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗)  with 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0  (for 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽 ) and 
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1 = 1. This leads to a prospect defined to be 𝑔𝑔 = ��𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗�𝑗𝑗=1𝐽𝐽 , �𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗�𝑗𝑗=1𝐽𝐽 �. Without loss of generality, 
it is assumed that  𝑡𝑡1 < 𝑡𝑡2 < ⋯ < 𝑡𝑡𝐽𝐽. Therefore, 𝑝𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽 are the left-tail and right-tail probabilities 
of the distribution respectively. Let 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘≥𝑗𝑗  denote the corresponding discrete survival function 
(𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽 + 1) with 𝑃𝑃𝐽𝐽+1 = 0.  
Suppose that a decision-maker transforms the survival function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = Pr (𝑇𝑇 > 𝑡𝑡) shown in a 
choice experiment into a new survival function 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) via a CRWF, 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃): 
𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑊𝑊(𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡)).          (4) 
Clearly, for the given two survival functions 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) and  𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡), the CRWF that transforms 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) to  𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) 
is equal to 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)=𝐺𝐺[𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)]. Note that the risky weighting function 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝1, … ,𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽) in equation 
(2) is a special case of (4) where the survival function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) is discretised and represented by {𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗}𝑗𝑗=1𝐽𝐽+1 . 
In this case, the risky weighting function that maps from the probabilities 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 to decision weights 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 
(𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽) is defined explicitly as 
 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 ≔ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝1, … ,𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽) =  𝑊𝑊�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗� −𝑊𝑊�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗+1� = 𝑊𝑊(∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙) −𝑊𝑊(∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙)𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙=𝑗𝑗+1𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙=𝑗𝑗 , (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽). 
Note that the difference between CPT and the original version of prospect theory is that it is the 
cumulative probability distribution function, rather than probability mass function, in CPT that is 
applied to the perceptual conditioning because the functional form of prospect theory violates 
stochastic dominance (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wakker, 2010). Empirical studies also favour 
cumulative prospect theory over prospect theory (e.g., Fennema and Wakker, 1997). 
From a probabilistic perspective, a transformation function for a probability measure implicitly 
derives a transformation function for the corresponding random variables. Theorem 1 below shows 
that a CRWF 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)  is linked to a transformation function that connects the primary outcomes 
presented in the choice experiment to the ones that are perceived by the decision-makers. 
 
Theorem 1. The CRWF 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)=𝐺𝐺[𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)] that transforms a survival function  𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) to  𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) derives a 
transformation function 𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) = 𝐺𝐺−1[𝐹𝐹(𝑇𝑇)] such that 
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(i) it transforms the primary outcome variable 𝑇𝑇 with survival function  𝐹𝐹 to the decision-maker’s 
perceived outcome  𝑆𝑆 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) with survival function 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐹𝐹(𝐻𝐻−1(𝑡𝑡));  
(ii) 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) and 𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) are connected via 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)=𝐹𝐹(𝐻𝐻−1[𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)]).  
 
See Appendix A for proof. The above theorem indicates that 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) and 𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) can be mutually 
determined for a given underlying survival function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡). In practice, therefore, we only need to focus 
on one of them if 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) is specified.  
 
2.3.   Properties of CRWFs  
In this section, we propose a large class of CRWFs and investigate some important properties 
about decision-makers’ risky weighting.  
 
2.3.1.   A class of CRWFs 
From Theorem 1, in order to fully specify a CRWF, the transformation 𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) and underlying 
survival function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡)  need to be determined. We consider an important case of perceptual 
conditioning where the decision-makers’ perceived outcomes are transformed from 𝑇𝑇  to 𝑆𝑆 via: 
 𝐻𝐻 :      𝑆𝑆 = (𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇)𝜆𝜆            for 𝜆𝜆 > 0 and 𝑚𝑚 > 0,      (5) 
where following Prelec (1998), we restrict 𝜆𝜆 > 0. Clearly transformation function (5) ensures that the 
support ℜ+  of the primary outcome variable is invariant. According to Theorem 1, equation (5) 
implicitly derives a broad class of CRWFs for any survival function 𝐹𝐹(. ) as defined below:   𝒜𝒜 = �𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) ≔ 𝐹𝐹�{𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆/𝑚𝑚�� for any survival function 𝐹𝐹(. ) on ℜ+, 𝜆𝜆 > 0 ,𝑚𝑚 > 0}.  (6) 
As it will be shown latter (see Theorems 2 and 3), the parameter 𝜆𝜆 in (6) plays a central role in 
determining the shape of the CRWFs belonging to class 𝒜𝒜 and is termed risk perception parameter. 
By definition, for any survival function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) on  ℜ+, a CRWF 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) ∈ 𝒜𝒜  transforms 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) to  
 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) = Pr�(𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇)𝜆𝜆 > 𝑡𝑡� = Pr�𝑇𝑇 > 𝑡𝑡1/𝜆𝜆/𝑚𝑚� = 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡1/𝜆𝜆/𝑚𝑚)      for 𝜆𝜆 > 0 and 𝑚𝑚 > 0. (7) 
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Consequently, choosing a different survival function 𝐹𝐹(. ) leads to a different CRWF. Hence, there are 
an infinite number of CRWFs belonging to class (6); as a result, the class of risky weighting functions 
(6) provides flexibility to model a wide range of practical problems.  
Power transformation is usually a good approximation of many monotonically increasing 
functions that a decision-maker may use in practice. It is widely used in many economic analyses such 
as the well-known Cobb–Douglas production function. The power transformation can also be justified 
from a statistical perspective. This transformation is known as the Box-Cox transformation in 
statistical analysis. A more general form of the Box-Cox transformation is 𝑆𝑆 = (𝑇𝑇𝜆𝜆 − 1)/𝜆𝜆 . 
According to Box and Cox (1964), (𝑇𝑇𝜆𝜆 − 1)/𝜆𝜆  is slightly preferable in theoretical analysis because it 
is continuous at 𝜆𝜆 = 0. In this paper, however, we follow Prelec (1998) and restrict 𝜆𝜆 > 0; a negative 
value of 𝜆𝜆 transforms gains into losses, which does not make any practical sense. Mathematically, an 
obvious advantage of using the power transformation (5) over  𝑆𝑆 = (𝑇𝑇𝜆𝜆 − 1)/𝜆𝜆 is that the former 
ensures the support ℜ+ of the primary outcomes invariant but the latter may lead to negative values. 
Hence we use (5) throughout this paper. Technically, the parameter 𝑚𝑚 in equation (5) affects the scale 
of the perceived outcomes. In some applications, it is taken as 1 (i.e., without a scale transformation) 
or 𝜆𝜆−1/𝜆𝜆. Note that in the latter case, equation (5) becomes 𝑆𝑆 = 𝑇𝑇𝜆𝜆/𝜆𝜆. There are some other choices 
for the scale parameter 𝑚𝑚 in the Box-Cox transformation; see, for example, Weisberg (2005).  
Next, we turn to discuss some important theoretical properties for decision-makers’ risky 
weighting. Prelec (1998) considered four important properties that CRWFs are expected to possess, 
i.e., (a) regressiveness, (b) asymmetry, (c) inverse-s shape, and (d) reflectiveness. The following 
theorem investigates these properties for any 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) ∈ 𝒜𝒜  with 𝜆𝜆 > 1. 
 
Theorem 2A. For any 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) = 𝐹𝐹({𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆/𝑚𝑚) ∈ 𝒜𝒜  with 𝑚𝑚 = 1 and 𝜆𝜆 > 1, we have  
(i) 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) is an increasing function of 𝑃𝑃 with 𝑊𝑊(0) = 0 and 𝑊𝑊(1) = 1; 
(ii) For continuous 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) , there exists a fixed-point (probability) 𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝐹𝐹(1)  satisfying 
𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃∗)  such that 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) ≥ 𝑃𝑃  for any 𝑃𝑃 ∈ (0, 𝑃𝑃∗)  and  𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) ≤ 𝑃𝑃  for any 𝑃𝑃 ∈
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(𝑃𝑃∗, 1) .  If 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡)  is strictly decreasing and 0 < 𝐹𝐹(1)  < 1,  then the fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗  is 
unique on the interval (0, 1); 
(iii) The left-tail decision weight 𝑞𝑞1 = 1 −𝑊𝑊(1 − 𝑝𝑝1)  is an increasing function of 𝜆𝜆  if  
𝑝𝑝1 < 1 − 𝑃𝑃∗; the right-tail decision weight 𝑞𝑞𝐽𝐽 = 𝑊𝑊�𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽� is also an increasing function of 𝜆𝜆 
if 𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽 < 𝑃𝑃∗ . Hence the CRWF overweights a small left-tail decision weight and a small 
right-tail decision weight; 
(iv) As the risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆 becomes sufficiently large, the left-tail and right-tail 
decision weights 𝑞𝑞1 = 1 −𝑊𝑊(1 − 𝑝𝑝1)  and 𝑞𝑞𝐽𝐽 = 𝑊𝑊�𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽�  approach to 1 − 𝑃𝑃∗  and 𝑃𝑃∗ 
respectively; all the other decision weights 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗  (𝑗𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽𝐽 − 1) vanish. 
 
The proof of Theorem 2A is given in Appendix A. Property (i) ensures that the transformed 
function 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑊𝑊(𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡)) is a well-defined survival function. Properties (ii)-(iii) are related to the 
regressiveness and inverse-s shape natures of the cumulative risky weighting curve 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) 
(𝑃𝑃 ∈ [0, 1] ): 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)  holds at the two end-points  𝑃𝑃 = 0  and 1 respectively; the curve also 
intersects the diagonal line of 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑃𝑃  at the fixed point 𝑃𝑃∗ . In addition, the curve 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) 
overweights a small left-tail probability and a small right-tail probability. Property (iv) further shows 
that 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡)  is approximately a U-shaped distribution for large 𝜆𝜆  with its limiting distribution of a 
Bernoulli distribution that takes values at the two extreme ends only, i.e. 𝑡𝑡1 and 𝑡𝑡𝐽𝐽.  
Barberis (2013) emphasises that risky weighting means that the decision-makers overweight the 
two tails of any distribution (i.e., overweight unlikely extreme outcomes). This is consistent with 
Theorem 2A.  Note that the fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗of the asymmetry property in Prelec (1998) is expected to 
lie in the range of 1/3 to 1/2; the inverse-s shape feature in Prelec (1998) also requires that the curve 
𝑄𝑄 = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) be concave within an initial interval and be convex beyond that. However, because there is  
little restriction imposed on the shape of survival function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) here, these strong properties do not 
generally hold. A further investigation will be undertaken in the next subsection.  
The following theorem discusses the case of 0 < 𝜆𝜆 < 1. The proof is given in Appendix A. 
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Theorem 2B. For any 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) = 𝐹𝐹({𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆/𝑚𝑚) ∈ 𝒜𝒜  with 𝑚𝑚 = 1 and 0 < 𝜆𝜆 < 1, we have  
(i) 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) is an increasing function of 𝑃𝑃 with 𝑊𝑊(0) = 0 and 𝑊𝑊(1) = 1; 
(ii) For continuous 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) , there exists a fixed-point (probability) 𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝐹𝐹(1)  satisfying 
𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃∗)  such that  𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) ≤ 𝑃𝑃  for any 𝑃𝑃 ∈ (0, 𝑃𝑃∗)  and  𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) ≥ 𝑃𝑃  for any 𝑃𝑃 ∈(𝑃𝑃∗, 1). If 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) is strictly decreasing and 0 < 𝐹𝐹(1)  < 1,  then the fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗ is unique 
on the interval (0, 1); 
(iii) The left-tail decision weight 𝑞𝑞1 = 1 −𝑊𝑊(1 − 𝑝𝑝1)  is an increasing function of 𝜆𝜆  if  
𝑝𝑝1 < 1 − 𝑃𝑃∗; the right-tail decision weight 𝑞𝑞𝐽𝐽 = 𝑊𝑊�𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽� is also an increasing function of 𝜆𝜆 
if 𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽 < 𝑃𝑃∗ . Hence the CRWF underweights a small left-tail decision weight and a small 
right-tail decision weight; 
(iv) As the risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆 > 0 becomes sufficiently small, the decision weights 
degenerate to a single-point distribution such that all the decision weights 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗  vanish 
except for one, 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗0 = 1, where 𝑗𝑗0 is the state with 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗0 ≥ 1 − 𝑃𝑃∗ and 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗0+1 ≤ 1 − 𝑃𝑃∗. 
 
Clearly, the case of 0 < 𝜆𝜆 < 1 describes an unusual circumstance in practical decision-making: 
decision-makers underestimate the tail probabilities. This can occasionally occur in reality. For 
example, if the respondents believe that the tail probabilities shown in a survey experiment are 
substantially larger than what they have experienced before, they may make some necessary 
adjustment for the decision weights; see Balcombe and Fraser (2015) for some examples.  
 
2.3.2.   A unified CRWF 
There are a number of existing CRWFs in the literature, some of which were formulated in an ad 
hoc manner, whereas the others were developed on the basis of a set of axioms (e.g., Prelec, 1998, 
Diecidue et al., 2009). In addition, Hsu et al. (2009) investigated risky weighting from a biological 
perspective; they reported a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment showing that 
neural response to expected reward is nonlinear in probabilities. Recently, Nardon and Pianca (2015) 
have reviewed different families of weighting functions in the literature. In this subsection, we propose 
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a unified CRWF that includes several commonly used weighting functions as special cases. The 
proposed unified CRWF helps us understand the relationships among these existing risky weighing 
functions, and also differentiates risky weighting in CPT from EUT. We first examine two important 
CRWFs in relation to the power transformation (5).  
 
Case I (Prelec, 1998). When the underlying survival function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡)  is chosen as the exponential 
distribution 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = exp (−𝑡𝑡/𝑏𝑏), the power transformation (5) leads to a Weibull distribution, 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) =exp [−𝑡𝑡1/𝜆𝜆/(𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏)]  and the following CRWF: 
 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)=𝐹𝐹(𝐻𝐻−1[𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)]) = exp (−𝜔𝜔[−log (𝑃𝑃)]1/𝜆𝜆)       with 𝜔𝜔 = 𝑏𝑏1/𝜆𝜆−1𝑚𝑚−1,            (8) 
where 𝑚𝑚 is the scale parameter in (5) and 𝑏𝑏 is the parameter of the underlying distribution 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) =exp (−𝑡𝑡/𝑏𝑏). Either 𝑚𝑚 or 𝑏𝑏 or both can be pre-specified. For example, as mentioned earlier,  𝑚𝑚 can be 
taken as 1 or 𝜆𝜆−1/𝜆𝜆 . If the primary outcomes are scaled to have a unit variance, then 𝑏𝑏 is set as 1. 
Alternatively, 𝜔𝜔 can be estimated in numerical analysis. 
  𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) in (8) is termed Prelec II function in the literature. When 𝜔𝜔 is pre-set as 1, it is termed 
Prelec I function. In addition, we note that when 𝜆𝜆 = 1, the CRWF in (8) becomes   
 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) =  𝑃𝑃𝜂𝜂.            
with 𝜂𝜂 = 1/𝑚𝑚. Hence, a power transformation of the probability is a special case of Prelec II function. 
This function was also considered in De Palma et al. (2008), Diecidue et al. (2009), Abdellaoui et al. 
(2010), and Beaud and Willinger (2015). In particular, taking 𝜂𝜂 = 1, we obtain 
 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) = 𝑃𝑃.           (9) 
This is the case corresponding to no risky weighting, a scenario considered in EUT.  
Case II (Goldstein and Einhorn, 1987). When the underlying survival function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) is chosen as the 
log-logistic distribution 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = 1/(1 + 𝑡𝑡/𝑏𝑏) , the power transformation (5) leads to a log-logistic 
distribution, 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) = 1/[1 + 𝑡𝑡1/𝜆𝜆/(𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏)]  and the Goldstein-Einhorn’s CRWF: 
 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)=𝐹𝐹(𝐻𝐻−1[𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)]) = 𝑃𝑃1/𝜆𝜆/[𝑃𝑃1/𝜆𝜆 + 𝜔𝜔(1 − 𝑃𝑃)1/𝜆𝜆]       with 𝜔𝜔 = 𝑏𝑏1/𝜆𝜆−1𝑚𝑚−1.     (10) 
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Karmarkar (1978) considered the following logit transformation of the probabilities: 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔 𝑄𝑄
1−𝑄𝑄
=
𝑚𝑚−1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔
𝑃𝑃
1−𝑃𝑃
. Note that the above relationship can be rewritten as 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1(𝑚𝑚−1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃)), where 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1(𝑡𝑡) is the inverse function of the logit transformation, or equivalently 𝑄𝑄 = 𝐹𝐹(𝑚𝑚−1𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)), 
where 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = 1[1+exp(𝑡𝑡)] = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1(−𝑡𝑡)  is the logistic survival function. Hence, by choosing the 
logistic survival function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = 1/[1 + exp (𝑡𝑡)] and setting 𝜆𝜆 = 1, the Karmarkar’s risky weighting 
function 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) = 𝐹𝐹({𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆/𝑚𝑚) is of form (10). 
Two questions arise from a practical perspective: (a) in which way are these existing risky 
weighting functions related to each other? (b) how do we choose a CRWF  𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)  among many 
candidate functions? Clearly, if the choice is restricted to the class 𝒜𝒜 defined in equation (6), this is 
equivalent to the choice of the underlying survival function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡). To address these research issues, we 
propose a general CRWF that is based on the following underlying survival function:  
 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡;𝜅𝜅) = 1/[1 + 𝑡𝑡/ (𝜅𝜅𝑏𝑏)]𝜅𝜅 for 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0   and 𝜅𝜅 > 0.     (11) 
In the literature, this distribution is termed type I generalised log-logistic distribution. See, e.g., 
Balakrishnan (1992, Chapter 9), for a detailed discussion of the statistical properties of type I 
generalised logistic distribution.  𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡;𝜅𝜅) = 1/[1 + 𝑡𝑡/ (𝜅𝜅𝑏𝑏)]𝜅𝜅 is also a scaled F-distribution with the 
first degree of freedom of 2, the second degree of freedom of 2𝜅𝜅, and the scale parameter 𝑏𝑏. 
The underlying distribution (11) derives the following CRWF belonging to class 𝒜𝒜: 
 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) = 𝐹𝐹(𝐻𝐻−1[𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)]) = 𝑃𝑃1/𝜆𝜆/[𝑃𝑃1/(𝜅𝜅𝜆𝜆) + 𝜔𝜔𝜅𝜅1/𝜆𝜆−1(1 − 𝑃𝑃1/𝜅𝜅)1/𝜆𝜆]𝜅𝜅 with 𝜔𝜔 = 𝑏𝑏1/𝜆𝜆−1𝑚𝑚−1,   (12) 
that transforms 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡; 𝜅𝜅) to  𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡; 𝜅𝜅) = 1/[1 + 𝑡𝑡1/𝜆𝜆/(𝜅𝜅𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏)]𝜅𝜅.  
The proposed CRWF (12) includes several important CRWFs in the literature as special cases: 
(i) As 𝜅𝜅 → +∞ with 𝜆𝜆 = 1 and 𝜔𝜔 = 1,  𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡;𝜅𝜅) = 1/[1 + 𝑡𝑡/ (𝜅𝜅𝑏𝑏)]𝜅𝜅  in (11) approaches the 
exponential distribution 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = exp (−𝑡𝑡/𝑏𝑏). Hence, the CRWF in (12) approaches the 
identity function in (9); 
(ii) As 𝜅𝜅 → +∞,  𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡;𝜅𝜅) = 1/[1 + 𝑡𝑡/ (𝜅𝜅𝑏𝑏)]𝜅𝜅 in (11) approaches the exponential distribution 
𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = exp (−𝑡𝑡/𝑏𝑏). Hence, the CRWF in (12) approaches Prelec’s function in (8); 
14 
 
(iii) As 𝜅𝜅 = 1 ,  𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡; 𝜅𝜅) = 1/[1 + 𝑡𝑡/ (𝜅𝜅𝑏𝑏)]𝜅𝜅  collapses to the log-logistic distribution 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) =1/(1 + 𝑡𝑡/𝑏𝑏). Hence, the CRWF in (12) becomes the Goldstein-Einhorn’s function in (10); 
(iv) Let 𝑃𝑃� = 𝑃𝑃𝜂𝜂. Then the CRWF in (12) can be written as 𝑃𝑃�1/(𝜂𝜂𝜆𝜆)/[𝑃𝑃�1/(𝜂𝜂𝜅𝜅𝜆𝜆) + 𝜔𝜔𝜅𝜅1/𝜆𝜆−1(1 −
𝑃𝑃�1/(𝜂𝜂𝜅𝜅))1/𝜆𝜆]𝜅𝜅. This is related to Wu-Gonzalez’s CRWF, 𝑃𝑃1/𝜆𝜆/[𝑃𝑃1/𝜆𝜆 + (1 − 𝑃𝑃)1/𝜆𝜆]𝜅𝜅 (Wu 
and Gonzalez, 1996), and Tversky-Kahneman’s function  𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) = 𝑃𝑃1/𝜆𝜆/[𝑃𝑃1/𝜆𝜆 + (1 −
𝑃𝑃)1/𝜆𝜆]𝜆𝜆  (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
 
Case (i) corresponds to the scenario where the risky weighting function is an identity function, i.e. 
the case of EUT where no transformation is involved. In empirical analysis, we can statistically test if 
the evidence is in favour of EUT against CPT by checking if 𝜆𝜆 = 1, 𝜔𝜔 = 1 and 𝜅𝜅 → +∞.  
In addition, from cases (ii) and (iii), Prelec’s function and Goldstein-Einhorn’s function are two 
special cases of the unified CRWF (12) with parameter 𝜅𝜅 at the two extreme spectrums of its range. 
Again, statistical tests can be performed to decide which risky weighting function is more preferable.  
We also note that case (iv) can be considered as a combination of the power transformation and 
(12), i.e., a scale transformation ( 𝜆𝜆 = 1  and 𝑚𝑚 = 1/𝜂𝜂 ) with 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡; +∞) ,  followed by a power 
transformation (𝜆𝜆 ≠ 1 and 𝑚𝑚 = 1) with 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡; 𝜅𝜅). It is of interest to note that this is also related to the 
source preference model developed in Fox and Tversky (1998) for the situation where people’s choice 
depends not only on the degree of uncertainty but also on its source, i.e. [𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)]𝛿𝛿 , where 𝛿𝛿 > 0 is a 
parameter that is inversely related to the attractiveness of the source. Clearly, risky weighting with 
source preference can be modelled as a combination of (12) and the power transformation, i.e., a 
power transformation (𝜆𝜆 ≠ 1 and 𝑚𝑚 = 1) with 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡; 𝜅𝜅), followed by a scale transformation (𝜆𝜆 = 1 and 
𝑚𝑚 = 1/𝛿𝛿) with 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡; +∞). 
From a perspective of numerical computation, since the unified CRWF in (12) includes these 
commonly used CRWFs as special cases, the choice for risky weighting function amounts to the 
choice for parameters in (12). Consequently, instead of exploring each of the commonly used CRWFs 
separately in empirical analysis (like it was done in Hensher et al., 2011), the choice for risky 
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weighting function can be automatically made by estimating these parameters during the data analysis 
stage, leading to a data-driven model-selection approach.  
To better understand the proposed risky weighting function, we further explore the four important 
characteristics about CRWFs investigated in Prelec (1998). We show below that the unified CRWF 
(12) has much stronger properties in comparison with those in Theorems 2 and 3. We consider the 
situation where the primary outcome variable has been re-scaled to have a unit scale parameter 𝑏𝑏 = 1 
so that the following conclusions do not rely on the measurement unit of the primary outcome variable.  
 
Theorem 3. For the unified CRWF (12) with 𝑚𝑚 = 1 and 𝑏𝑏 = 1, there exists a unique fixed-point 
(probability) 𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝐹𝐹(1; 𝜅𝜅) satisfying 𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃∗) such that 
(i) 0.367 < 𝑃𝑃∗ < 0.5 for 𝜅𝜅 ∈ (1, +∞); 
(ii) 𝑃𝑃∗ = 0.5 for 𝜅𝜅 = 1; 
(iii) 0.5 < 𝑃𝑃∗ < 1  for  𝜅𝜅 ∈ (0, 1); 
(iv) For 𝜆𝜆 > 1, 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) is concave and 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) > 𝑃𝑃 for any 𝑃𝑃 ∈ (0, 𝑃𝑃∗), and 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) is convex 
and 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) < 𝑃𝑃 for any 𝑃𝑃 ∈ (𝑃𝑃∗, 1); 
(v) For 0 < 𝜆𝜆 < 1 , 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)  is convex and 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) < 𝑃𝑃  for any 𝑃𝑃 ∈ (0, 𝑃𝑃∗) , and 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)  is 
concave and 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) > 𝑃𝑃 for any 𝑃𝑃 ∈ (𝑃𝑃∗, 1). 
 
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix A. The upper and lower left panels of Figure 1 
illustrate Theorem 3 parts (i), (iii) and (iv), where the function 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) with 𝜆𝜆=2 is plotted against 
𝑃𝑃 using (12) (the real line) for 𝜅𝜅 = 30 (upper left) and for 𝜅𝜅 = 0.2 (lower left). This is compared with 
the straight-line 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑃𝑃  (the dotted line); the latter is the case where the risk perception does not 
involve any risky weighting, i.e. equation (9). Likewise, the upper and lower left panels of Figure 2 
illustrate Theorem 3 parts (i), (iii) and (v), where the function 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) with 𝜆𝜆=0.5 is plotted against 
𝑃𝑃 using (12) (the real line) for 𝜅𝜅 = 30 (upper left) and for 𝜅𝜅 = 0.2 (lower left).  
In addition, to demonstrate the impact of different risk perception parameter values, we consider a 
number of mass probabilities all equal to 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 = 0.10 (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,10). This represents the scenario where 
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the primary outcome at all states of nature has an equal probability (i.e. 0.10). We then apply the risky 
weighting  𝑄𝑄 = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) in (12) with several different values of 𝜆𝜆, i.e. 2, 4, and 10, to transform these 
probabilities 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗  to obtain decision weights 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗  ( 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,10 ). The resulting decision weights are 
displayed in the upper and lower right panels of Figure 1, where the original probability (0.10) and the 
decision weights transformed with 𝜆𝜆= 2, 4, and 10 are plotted. Note that the four probability values for 
each of the states are clustered in the bar chart (bars from left to right at each state of nature are the 
original probability of 0.1 and the associated risky weighting with  𝜆𝜆=2, 4, and 10 respectively). Take 
the lower right panel of Figure 1 as an example: the furthermost bar on the far right at each state shows 
a J-shaped distribution of the decision weights which are transformed with  𝜆𝜆=10. On the other hand, 
the decision weights without risky weighting have a uniform distribution as displayed by the 
furthermost bar on the far left at each state. 
From Theorem 3, the asymmetry of the fixed point depends on the range of parameter 𝜅𝜅, which in 
turn has an important implication to the risk attitude of the decision-makers. Specifically, Theorem 3 (i) 
shows that the fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗ is less than 0.5 for any 𝜅𝜅 ∈ (1, +∞), as displayed in the upper left graph 
of Figure 1. From Theorem 2A, the left-tail decision weight 𝑞𝑞1 = 1 −𝑊𝑊(1 − 𝑝𝑝1)  approaches to 1 − 𝑃𝑃∗ ∈ [0.5, 0.632] as the risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆 becomes large. When the left-tail and right-
tail probabilities are equal, i.e. 𝑝𝑝1 = 𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽, the asymmetry in Theorem 3 (i) leads to a higher left-tail 
decision weight 𝑞𝑞1 than the right-tail 𝑞𝑞𝐽𝐽, as displayed by Figure 1 (upper right). As the risk perception 
parameter 𝜆𝜆 becomes sufficiently large, the right-tail (or left-tail) decision weight approaches 𝑃𝑃∗ =
𝐹𝐹(1; 30) = 0.374  (or 1 − 𝑃𝑃∗ = 0 .626) for 𝜅𝜅 = 30 . When the primary outcomes are gains, this 
suggests that the perceptual conditioning tends to increase more in risk-aversion for losses than gains. 
On the other hand, Theorem 3 (iii) shows that for 0 < 𝜅𝜅 < 1, the fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝐹𝐹(1;𝜅𝜅) lies in 
the range of 0.5 < 𝑃𝑃∗ < 1, as displayed in the lower left graph of Figure 1. As 𝜆𝜆 becomes large, the 
right-tail (or left-tail) decision weight approaches  𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝐹𝐹(1; 0.2) = 0.699 (or 1 − 𝑃𝑃∗ = 0.301) for 
𝜅𝜅 = 0.2. In other words, with 𝑃𝑃∗ > 0.5, the decision weights are J-shaped. Hence, when the primary 
outcomes are gains, the perceptual conditioning tends to increase more in risk-aversion for gains than 
losses. 
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In addition, Theorem 3 (ii) with 𝜅𝜅 = 1 is the Goldstein-Einhorn’s CRWF for which the decision-
maker’s risk attitude does not favour either gains or losses. Because the parameter 𝜅𝜅  reflects the 
degrees of asymmetry of the fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗, as well as the skewness of the decision weights, it is 
termed an asymmetry parameter in this paper.  
Theorem 3 (iv) shows the regressiveness and inverse-s shape natures of the unified CRWF  in (12) 
when 𝜆𝜆 > 1. It is important to note that the fixed-point and inflection point coincide, as illustrated in 
the upper left and lower left graphs of Figure 1. 
Finally, Theorem 3 (v), corresponding to Theorem 2B with 0 < 𝜆𝜆 < 1, describes the scenario that 
decision-makers underweight the tail probabilities. From the upper left and lower left graphs of Figure 
2, the cumulative risky weighting curve still shows the regressiveness with a unique fixed-point that 
coincides the inflection point.  It is also clear that the curve is s-shaped (rather than inversely s-shaped). 
The upper right (or lower right) graph of Figure 2 shows that, as 𝜆𝜆 becomes sufficiently small, all the 
decision weights approaches to 0 except for one state. See also, Abdellaoui et al. (2010), for a 
discussion about the link between risky weighting function and probabilistic risk attitudes. 
 
Figure 1. Overweighted tail probabilities: the left panels show CRWF  𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) of the square 
transformation (𝜆𝜆 = 2) in (12) when  𝜅𝜅 = 30 (upper left) and 𝜅𝜅 = 0.2 (lower left); 
The right panels show decision weights for the original equal mass probabilities 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 = 0.1 (for all states 𝑗𝑗) 
and using (12) with 𝜆𝜆= 2, 4, 10 (bars from left to right at each state respectively) when 𝜅𝜅 = 30 (upper 
right) and 𝜅𝜅 = 0.2 (lower right). 
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Figure 2. Underweighted tail probabilities: the left panels show CRWF  𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) of the square root 
transformation (𝜆𝜆 = 0.5)  in (12) when 𝜅𝜅 = 30 (upper left) and 𝜅𝜅 = 0.2 (lower left); 
The right panels show decision weights for the original equal mass probabilities 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 = 0.1 (for all states 𝑗𝑗) 
and using (12) with 𝜆𝜆=1/2, 1/4, 1/10 (from left to right at each state respectively) when 𝜅𝜅 = 30 (upper right) 
and 𝜅𝜅 = 0.2 (lower right). 
 
In practice, most empirical evidence supports inverse-s probability weighting but s-shape 
weighting functions were also documented in the literature. See Prelec (1998), Balcombe and Fraser 
(2015) and the references therein for further discussion on inverse-s and s shapes of CRWFs.  
We also note that in Theorem 3, the unique fixed-point (probability) 𝑃𝑃∗  for 𝜅𝜅 ∈ (1, +∞)  is 
bounded in the range of 𝑃𝑃∗ ∈ (0.367,0.5). This is consistent with Prelec (1998) that indicates the 
fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗ lies in the range of 1/3 to 1/2. It seems that the lower bound of 0.367 may be restrictive 
in some applications. However, the fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗ falls in this range only for the unit scale parameter 
𝑚𝑚 in transformation (5). The following corollary shows that in general the lower bound of the fixed-
point is also partially determined by the scale parameter 𝑚𝑚 in transformation (5).  
Corollary. For the unified CRWF (12) with 𝑏𝑏 = 1, the unique fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗ satisfying 𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃∗) 
is given by 𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝐹𝐹(𝑚𝑚𝜆𝜆/(𝜆𝜆−1);𝜅𝜅). Hence for 𝜆𝜆 > 1 and 𝑚𝑚 > 1, we have  𝑃𝑃∗ ∈ (0, 0.5) for 𝜅𝜅 ∈ (1, +∞). 
In particular, 𝑃𝑃∗ approaches 0 as 𝑚𝑚 → +∞. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
State of nature
D
ec
is
io
n 
w
ei
gh
t
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Cumulative probability
Tr
an
sf
or
m
ed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
State of nature
D
ec
is
io
n 
w
ei
gh
t
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Cumulative probability
Tr
an
sf
or
m
ed
19 
 
The proof of the Corollary is given in Appendix A. This shows that the scale parameter affects the 
location of the fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗:  by allowing the scale parameter 𝑚𝑚 to vary, the fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗ can take 
values anywhere in the range of (0, 0.5).  
In many choice survey instruments, the number of states, 𝐽𝐽, of a contract  𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 = ��𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗�𝑗𝑗=1𝐽𝐽 , �𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝑗𝑗=1𝐽𝐽 � 
is usually set to be small (typically 2 to 4) to avoid overcomplicated choice situations that could 
confuse the respondents. The information provided in the survey instruments is hence not sufficient to 
elicit the entire survival function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡). We show in Appendix B that, when eliciting prior knowledge 
with limited information, the distribution (11) is the optimal underlying survival function that 
maximises a constrained entropy. In other words, the unified CRWF (12) is optimal in the sense of the 
maximum entropy when choosing a CRWF within class 𝒜𝒜. 
Finally, before concluding this section, we briefly discuss the scenario of 𝑇𝑇 ∈ ℜ. Two approaches 
can be used here. First, we note that the log-transformation converts any nonnegative primary outcome 
variable on ℜ+ to a real-valued outcome variable on the real line ℜ. Hence, one approach is to use the 
log-transformation so that all the results obtained in this section can be applied. A more popular 
approach in the literature (see, e.g., Wakker, 2010) is to consider a piecewise CRWF: 
𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) = �𝑊𝑊+(𝑃𝑃)   if 𝑇𝑇 ≥ 0
𝑊𝑊−(𝑃𝑃)   if 𝑇𝑇 < 0 . 
Clearly, for each of 𝑊𝑊+(𝑃𝑃) and 𝑊𝑊−(𝑃𝑃), the proposed method in this section can be used.  The 
parameters in the unified CRWF (12) for 𝑊𝑊+(𝑃𝑃) and 𝑊𝑊−(𝑃𝑃) are usually set differently. As people 
may view gains and losses very differently (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), the second approach is 
more preferable in many applications.  
3.   Modelling of choice behaviour with risky prospects 
In this section, we will investigate the modelling of decision-makers’ choice behaviour with risky 
prospects on the basis of the unified CRWF (12).  
We consider the stochastic form of CPT. To describe the stochastic nature of travellers’ choices, 
we incorporate the approach of discrete choice analysis. There are three components to be considered 
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within this research framework, i.e. risky weighting function, value function and link function. We 
show in this section that the power utility function and the multiplicative discrete choice model are a 
natural choice for the class of risky weighting functions in (6).  
 
3.1.   Value function  
In the previous section we focused on CRWFs. We now consider the next component in CPT, i.e. 
the value function. We assume that for given primary outcomes over ℜ+, a decision-maker’s value (or 
utility) function of choosing a prospect is a random variable. We break down the value function into a 
non-stochastic systematic part ?̅?𝑣(𝑡𝑡;𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏) termed subutility and a stochastic component 𝜀𝜀 for the given 
primary outcomes. The two parts are assumed to connect each other via the following multiplicative 
model: 
𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡;𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏) = ?̅?𝑣(𝑡𝑡;𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏) 𝜀𝜀.         (13) 
In this subsection, we focus on the subutility ?̅?𝑣(𝑡𝑡; 𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏). The stochastic component 𝜀𝜀  will be modelled 
via the link function in the next subsection.  
For the non-stochastic subutility function, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) considered the constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function: 
?̅?𝑣(𝑡𝑡;𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏) = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡1−𝜏𝜏/(1 − 𝜏𝜏)        (14) 
where 𝜏𝜏  is risk attitude coefficient and 𝜇𝜇 is an individual specific parameter. The CRRA utility is also 
considered in many other studies, e.g., Prelec (1998), Gao et al. (2010), Hensher et al. (2011), and 
Beaud and Willinger (2015).  
As shown in Theorem 1, perceptual conditioning is a process that the decision-makers transform 
the primary outcome variable 𝑇𝑇 into their perceived outcome 𝑆𝑆 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇). Under this transformation, 
the subutility ?̅?𝑣(𝑆𝑆; 𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏) becomes ?̅?𝑣(𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) ;𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏): 
?̅?𝑣(𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) ;𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏) = 𝜇𝜇[𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇)](1−𝜏𝜏)/(1 − 𝜏𝜏).       (15) 
Hence, the consistency in functional form of the value (utility) function is retained via the power 
transformation if the decision-maker incorporates the CRRA utility form. This is summarised below. 
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Theorem 4. Suppose that the subutility function ?̅?𝑣(. ; 𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏) for a decision-maker is of the CRRA form 
as given in (14). Then the power transformation in (5) ensures that the subutility function ?̅?𝑣(𝐻𝐻(. ); 𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏) 
is also of the CRRA form.  
 
To characterise each decision-maker’s value function, we assume that the parameter 𝜇𝜇 in equation 
(14) is linked to a vector of covariates termed attributes 𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = [𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛1, … , 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙]𝑇𝑇, denoted as 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛:  
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = exp ( 𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛),         (16) 
where 𝛃𝛃 = [𝛽𝛽1,…,𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙]𝑇𝑇 is a vector of parameters.  
Now we consider the expected value function that integrates the two components of CPT, i.e. the 
risky weighting and value functions. By definition, the expected value function with respect to the 
primary outcome variable is given by 𝐸𝐸 = −∫𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡;𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏)𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡). In the case of a finite number of states 
of nature, it reduces to (3), i.e. 
𝐸𝐸 = ∑ 𝑣𝑣�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗; 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛, 𝜏𝜏�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗(𝜆𝜆)𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1          
for each prospect 𝑖𝑖 , where 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗(𝜆𝜆) = 𝑊𝑊�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗; 𝜆𝜆� −𝑊𝑊�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗+1; 𝜆𝜆� and  𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃; 𝜆𝜆) = 𝑃𝑃1/𝜆𝜆/[𝑃𝑃1/(𝑣𝑣𝜆𝜆) +
𝜔𝜔𝑣𝑣1/𝜆𝜆−1(1 − 𝑃𝑃1/𝑣𝑣)1/𝜆𝜆]𝑣𝑣 is given by (12).  Consequently, from equation (13), the value function of 
decision-maker 𝑛𝑛 for choosing prospect 𝑖𝑖 is  
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = ?̅?𝑣(𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛;𝛃𝛃, 𝜆𝜆, 𝜏𝜏)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛exp ( 𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)(1 − 𝜏𝜏)−1 ∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(1−𝜏𝜏)𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗(𝜆𝜆),   (17) 
with the subutility  ?̅?𝑣(𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛;𝛃𝛃, 𝜆𝜆, 𝜏𝜏) = exp ( 𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)(1 − 𝜏𝜏)−1 ∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(1−𝜏𝜏)𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗(𝜆𝜆).   
 
3.2.   Link function and choice probability 
Now we turn to consider the stochastic component 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 in the multiplicative model (17).  
We consider the scenario where a decision-maker 𝑛𝑛 is facing a decision-making problem with 
several risky prospects. Rather than assume that the prospects under investigation are riskless in 
conventional discrete choice analysis (see, e.g., Hensher et al. 2015; Train 2009), we investigate a 
more general scenario where each prospect is risky and characterised by a contract (gamble) 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 =
��𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗�𝑗𝑗=1
𝐽𝐽 , �𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝑗𝑗=1𝐽𝐽 �. Following CPT, we take into consideration risky weighting of the decision-maker 
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so that his/her decision-making is based on 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = ?̅?𝑣(𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛;𝛃𝛃, 𝜆𝜆, 𝜏𝜏)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 in (17). A prospect 𝑖𝑖 is chosen if 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ≥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 {𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛}. The probability that this event occurs,  
 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = Pr {𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ≥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛}  ,        (18) 
is used to characterise the decision-making problem (see, e.g., Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985).  
To derive an explicit form of choice probability (18), we need to specify a statistical model for the 
stochastic component 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 of the value function in equation (17). Specifically, for the multiplicative 
model (17), we follow Fosgerau and Bierlaire (2009) and Li (2011), and assume that the independent 
error terms 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 have a Weibull distribution with 𝛼𝛼 > 0 the scale parameter of log (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛). When 𝜏𝜏 > 1, 
the choice probability (18) is given by 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝛃𝛃, 𝜆𝜆, 𝜏𝜏, 𝜅𝜅|𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛) = Pr�𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ≥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛�= Pr�−log (−𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)≥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 −log (−𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛)� 
= exp (−𝛼𝛼{𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛+|1−𝜏𝜏|+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1−𝜏𝜏)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆)]𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 })
∑ exp (−𝛼𝛼 {𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛+|1−𝜏𝜏|+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖(1−𝜏𝜏)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆)]}𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 )𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛    ,    
where 𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛 is a collection of all 𝐱𝐱𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛 for 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛. We note that the common term |1 − 𝜏𝜏| is cancelled out 
in the above expression. Hence, we obtain 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝛃𝛃, 𝜆𝜆, 𝜏𝜏, 𝜅𝜅|𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛) = exp (−𝛼𝛼{𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1−𝜏𝜏)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆)]𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 })∑ exp (−𝛼𝛼 {𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖(1−𝜏𝜏)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆)]}𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 )𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛    .   
Similar to the above analysis, we can obtain the following choice probability for 𝜏𝜏 < 1: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝛃𝛃, 𝜆𝜆, 𝜏𝜏, 𝜅𝜅|𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛) = Pr�𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ≥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛�= Pr�log (𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)≥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 log (𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛)� 
= exp (𝛼𝛼{𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1−𝜏𝜏)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆)]𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 })
∑ exp (𝛼𝛼 {𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖(1−𝜏𝜏)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆)]}𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 )𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛   . 
Let 𝜌𝜌 = 1 − 𝜏𝜏. The above two expressions can be written in a unified form: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝛃𝛃, 𝜆𝜆,𝜌𝜌, 𝜅𝜅|𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛) = exp (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛(𝜌𝜌){𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆)]𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 })∑ exp (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛(𝜌𝜌){𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆)]}𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 )𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛   ,    
with 𝛼𝛼 > 0. 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛(𝜌𝜌) is the sign function of 𝜌𝜌. 
Finally, if the primary outcomes are losses rather than gains, a prospect 𝑖𝑖  is chosen if 
−𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ≥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 {−𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛}. We can then obtain the following result by some simple manipulations: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝛃𝛃, 𝜆𝜆,𝜌𝜌, 𝜅𝜅|𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛) = exp (−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛(𝜌𝜌){𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆)]𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 })∑ exp (−𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛(𝜌𝜌){𝛃𝛃𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆)]}𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 )𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛   .    
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We offer the following remarks before concluding this section. First, although the CRRA model 
has been shown to be a natural choice in Section 3.1, this is not a restriction on the model specification; 
the value function and risky weighting function can be chosen separately.  
Secondly, the multiplicative model in (13) essentially leads to a weibit link funciton (Fosgerau and 
Bierlaire, 2009; Li, 2011); the weibit link is transformed to the logit link function via the log-
transformation.  Li (2011) proposed a distribution family consisting of an infinite number of link 
functions; this distribution family includes both logit and weibit links as special cases. We will discuss 
some potential extensions with this distribution family in Section 6. 
 
4.  Elicitation of risky weighting and value functions 
In this section, we discuss the elicitation of risky weighting and value functions via statistical 
inference.  
4.1.   Individual-specific risk perception 
So far, we have implicitly assumed that all decision-makers have a common risk perception 
parameter 𝜆𝜆 . In many applications, this assumption may not be realistic (DePalma et al., 2008; 
Glöckner and Pachur, 2012). We now relax this assumption. In doing so, the elicitation of the risky 
weighting function will be more accurate.  
Specifically, rather than assume the same transformation function 𝐻𝐻(. )  applying to all the 
decision-makers, we incorporate a more realistic assumption that each decision-maker 𝑛𝑛  has his/her 
own risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 , and hence the transformation is denoted as 𝑆𝑆 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇; 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛) =(𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇)𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 in equation (5) with the individual-specific risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 > 0 being written 
explicitly. For simplicity, here we consider the case that 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 is constant across all the individuals, i.e. 
𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 = 𝑚𝑚; otherwise, 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 or its log-transformation log (𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛) need to be included into the parameter vector  
𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛 to be defined in equation (19) below. The corresponding CRWF is denoted as 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃; 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛).  The 
decision weights in (2) are denoted as 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗(𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛) = 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗(𝑝𝑝1, … ,𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽; 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛) (𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽).  
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Let 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛 = log (𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛). This transforms a positive parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 to a real-valued parameter  𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛.  The 
following statistical model is specified for parameter 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛 for individual-specific risk perception:  
𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛~ 𝑝𝑝(𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛;𝜓𝜓0,𝜎𝜎2), 
where 𝜓𝜓0 is the location parameter and 𝜎𝜎 is the scale parameter; these two parameters characterise the 
centre of parameter 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛 across the whole population as well as its variability.   
In practice, the distribution 𝑝𝑝(𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛;𝜓𝜓0,𝜎𝜎2)  can be specified as a normal distribution; this is 
equivalent to stipulating a log-normal distribution for 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛. However, we point out that the methodology 
developed in this paper does not impose such a restriction; any reasonable distribution can be used. In 
addition, the risk perception parameter can potentially be linked to a number of covariates. See Section 
6 for further discussion.  
In many applications, the coefficients in vector 𝛃𝛃  can be treated as random variables. This 
approach is particularly useful for the scenario where each decision-maker faces more than one choice 
situation (which is typical in many choice experiments). In this case, the error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 and hence 
value function 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = ?̅?𝑣(𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛, ;𝛃𝛃, 𝜆𝜆)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛  in equation (17) are not independent of each other. We now 
follow McFadden and Train (2000) and use a random-coefficient discrete choice model to deal with 
this problem. 
In the random-coefficient choice model, each decision maker 𝑛𝑛 has a different coefficient vector, 
denoted as 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛 = [𝛽𝛽1𝑛𝑛,…,𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛]𝑇𝑇. 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛 is assumed to follow a statistical distribution, 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛~ 𝑝𝑝(𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛; 𝛏𝛏�), with an 
unknown parameter vector 𝛏𝛏�. A commonly used specification for the distribution of 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛 is a normal (or 
lognormal) distribution. In this case, 𝛏𝛏� includes both mean vector  𝛙𝛙� = [𝜓𝜓1, … ,𝜓𝜓𝐾𝐾]𝑇𝑇 and covariance 
matrix 𝚺𝚺�. In the case of normal distributions for 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛, parameters 𝜓𝜓1, … ,𝜓𝜓𝐾𝐾 represent the population 
means of 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛 which are usually of primary interest in practice.  
Unless it is known a priori that 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛  and 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛  are independent of each other, we can in general 
assume a joint distribution for them: 
 𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛~𝑝𝑝( 𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛;𝛙𝛙,𝚺𝚺),          (19) 
where  𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛 = [𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛,𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇]𝑇𝑇 and 𝛙𝛙 = [𝜓𝜓0,𝛙𝛙�𝑇𝑇]𝑇𝑇 . The covariance matrix 𝚺𝚺  consists of 𝜎𝜎2 , 𝚺𝚺� , and the 
covariances of 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛 and 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛.  
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We follow Train (2009) and extend the developed model to the case where the coefficient vector 
𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛 is a set of random variables. When the primary outcomes are gains, the choice probabilities are: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛,𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛,𝜌𝜌, 𝜅𝜅|𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛) = exp (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛(𝜌𝜌){𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛)]𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 })∑ exp (𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛(𝜌𝜌){𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛)]}𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 )𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛      (20) 
with 𝛼𝛼 > 0. The results for the case that the primary outcomes are losses can be worked out similarly: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛,𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛,𝜌𝜌, 𝜅𝜅|𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛) = exp (−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛(𝜌𝜌)({𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛)]𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 })∑ exp (−𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛(𝜌𝜌){{𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛)]}𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 )𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛   .   (21) 
Equation (20) (or (21)) is a multivariate model for choice analysis with risky prospects. It includes 
a generalised linear equation (16) that links the value function to a number of attributes in 𝐱𝐱; it also 
characterises risk perception by the individual-specific risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛.  
 
4.2.   Statistical inference   
To elicit the risky weighting function and the other components in CPT, a commonly used 
approach is the maximum likelihood method (see, e.g., Wakker, 2010). Recently, Toubia, et al. (2013) 
have considered Bayesian parameter estimation for CPT. Li (2011), on the other hand, considered 
Bayesian multinomial choice modelling.  
In this sub-section, we briefly outline a simple Bayesian approach to statistical inference for the 
developed model. As it will be seen, a Bayesian approach is particularly convenient when dealing with 
individual-specific random coefficients within the context of choice experiments.  
We consider a general situation where each decision-maker 𝑛𝑛 in a choice experiment faces 𝐾𝐾 
different choice situations. Let  𝐲𝐲𝑛𝑛 = [𝑖𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾]𝑇𝑇  denote the corresponding sequence of the choice 
alternatives in the 𝐾𝐾 choice situations.  
It is well known that a logit model is identifiable only up to a scale parameter (see, e.g., Hensher et 
al., 2015; Train, 2009; Fosgerau and Bierlaire, 2009; Li, 2011). Hence, we set the scale parameter 𝛼𝛼 to 
be unity in this paper.  
Let 𝛟𝛟 denote the collection of all fixed effect parameters, including 𝜌𝜌 and 𝜅𝜅, and 𝜑𝜑 = log (𝜆𝜆) (if a 
common risk perception is assumed), plus the coefficients of any fixed effects in the attribute vector 𝐱𝐱. 
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Let 𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛  denote the collection of all random coefficients, including 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛 = log (𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛)  (if assuming an 
individual-specific risk perception parameter), and the random coefficients in 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛. 
For each decision-maker 𝑛𝑛, the contribution to the likelihood is given by: 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛(𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛,𝛟𝛟| 𝐲𝐲𝑛𝑛,𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛) = ∏ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛(𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛,𝛟𝛟|𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛)𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 ,       
with 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛(𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛,𝛟𝛟|𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛) is given by (20) or (21).   
The above likelihood depends on the unknown vector 𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛 which is treated as a latent vector in the 
Bayesian analysis and specified by (19). Hence, the joint distribution for decision-maker 𝑛𝑛 is given by 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛(𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛,𝛟𝛟| 𝐲𝐲𝑛𝑛,𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛)𝑝𝑝( 𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛;𝛙𝛙,𝚺𝚺). Taking into account all the decision-makers, we can write out the 
likelihood function as ∏ 𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛(𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛,𝛟𝛟| 𝐲𝐲𝑛𝑛,𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛)𝑝𝑝( 𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛;𝛙𝛙,𝚺𝚺)𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1 .  
To fully specify the problem, we also need the prior distributions of 𝛟𝛟, 𝛙𝛙 and 𝚺𝚺, denoted as 𝜋𝜋(𝛟𝛟) 
and 𝜋𝜋(𝛙𝛙,𝚺𝚺) respectively. When no external information is available in the analysis, the non-
informative priors are used for 𝛙𝛙 and 𝚺𝚺. Following Train (2009) and Gelman et al. (2009), the prior 
for 𝛙𝛙 can be chosen as 𝜋𝜋(𝛙𝛙|𝚺𝚺) ∝ 1  and the prior for 𝚺𝚺 can be chosen to be inverse Wishart:  𝜋𝜋(𝚺𝚺) =
𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊(𝐾𝐾, 𝐈𝐈), where 𝐾𝐾 is the dimension of 𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛 and 𝐈𝐈 is the identity matrix of size 𝐾𝐾.  
We apply Bayes’ rule to obtain the posterior distribution  
𝑝𝑝(𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛,𝛟𝛟,𝛙𝛙,𝚺𝚺| 𝐲𝐲𝑛𝑛,𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛,∀𝑛𝑛) ∝ 𝜋𝜋(𝛟𝛟)𝜋𝜋(𝛙𝛙,𝚺𝚺)∏ 𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛(𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛,𝛟𝛟| 𝐲𝐲𝑛𝑛,𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛)𝑝𝑝( 𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛;𝛙𝛙,𝚺𝚺).𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1   (22) 
The above posterior distribution is not analytically tractable, and hence it needs to be evaluated 
numerically. The Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method with data augmentation can be used. 
We outline this iterative method as follows. 
Let 𝛙𝛙(𝑘𝑘), 𝚺𝚺(𝑘𝑘),  𝛟𝛟(𝑘𝑘),  𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛(𝑘𝑘) denote the draws of 𝛙𝛙, 𝚺𝚺, 𝛟𝛟, and 𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛 at the kth iteration of the MCMC. 
We set the initial guess 𝛟𝛟(0), 𝛙𝛙(0) and 𝚺𝚺(0) for 𝑘𝑘 = 0. Then for each k=1, 2, …, we draw a sample 
alternately: (a) simulate vectors  𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛(𝑘𝑘) from (22) for given 𝛟𝛟(𝑘𝑘−1) 𝛙𝛙(𝑘𝑘−1) and 𝚺𝚺(𝑘𝑘−1); and (b) simulate 
parameters 𝛟𝛟(𝑘𝑘), 𝛙𝛙(𝑘𝑘) and 𝚺𝚺(𝑘𝑘) from (22) for given 𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛(𝑘𝑘). This continues until the convergence.  
The simulation in step (a) can be based on the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm (see, e.g., Gelman et 
al., 2009).  The implementation for the simulation in step (b) depends on the assumption about 
𝑝𝑝(𝛉𝛉𝑛𝑛;𝛙𝛙,𝚺𝚺) in equation (19) and specification of the priors 𝜋𝜋(𝛟𝛟) and 𝜋𝜋(𝛙𝛙,𝚺𝚺). When the location 
parameters are assumed to follow a normal distribution and the scale parameters are assumed to follow 
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an inverse Wishart (or inverse gamma) distribution, Gibbs sampler can be embedded into the 
algorithm; see Train (2009) for details. Following Gelman et al. (2009), we use the deviance 
information criterion (DIC) for model comparison and selection in the Bayesian analysis.   
 
5.   Application 
In this section, we consider an empirical application on road tolling to illustrate the developed 
method. Road tolling has attracted a growing number of choice model applications in the last two 
decades. See the general overviews and discussion of Saleh (2005), Palma et al. (2006), and the 
references therein; see, in particular, Li and Hensher (2010) for an overview on road tolling in 
Australia. The application considered here is based on a stated preference survey undertaken in 
Australia. In the literature, choice analysis with risky prospects has been investigated with both stated 
preference data (e.g. Hess et al., 2008; Razo and Gao, 2013) and revealed data (e.g. Hu et al., 2012).  
 
5.1.   Data 
The data used in the analysis of this section were drawn from a large-scale study undertaken in 
2008 in Brisbane, Australia, in the context of toll vs. free roads, which utilised a stated choice 
experiment involving two alternatives (i.e., route A and route B) pivoted around the knowledge base 
of travellers (i.e., the current trip). The original large-scale study was designed and implemented to 
capture a large number of travel circumstances and to determine how each individual traveller trades-
off different levels of travel times and trip time variability with various levels of proposed tolls and 
vehicle running costs, in the context of tolled and non-tolled roads. 752 respondents were included 
into the original analysis. Each respondent considered 16 choice situations, hence resulting in 12,032 
choice situations in total. 
The primary outcome variable in this analysis was travel time; it was assumed to be subject to a 
great deal of uncertainty, depending on the traffic conditions. In the survey the respondents were 
advised that departure time remained unchanged and the prospects were described with three travel 
scenarios (states of nature), i.e., ‘arriving earlier than expected’, ‘arriving at the time expected’, and 
28 
 
‘arriving later than expected’; each was associated with a corresponding probability of occurrence. 
Table 1 gives an example of the payoffs table and Figure 3 is an illustrative choice scenario.  
Table 1. Example of payoffs (travel time in hours) in one choice situation of a traveller  
with the corresponding probability in parentheses 
State of nature arriving  earlier 
than expected 
arriving at the 
time expected 
arriving later 
than expected 
Prospect 1 0.28 (0.2) 0.32 (0.5) 0.42 (0.3) 
Prospect 2 0.37 (0.4) 0.40 (0.5) 0.50 (0.1) 
…………    
 
 
 
Figure 3 Illustrative Choice Scenario 
There were in total 734 travellers included into the analysis below after the initial data pre-
screening. Table 2 gives descriptive statistics of the sample on the payoffs (travel times in hours) and 
the corresponding probabilities.  We also included other attributes in the analysis, namely running 
costs (𝑚𝑚1) and toll costs (𝑚𝑚2), as well as the socioeconomic profile of the respondents: (a) age (𝑚𝑚3)  
(years); (b) gender (𝑚𝑚4) (male =1 and female=0); (c) hours of work in a typical week (𝑚𝑚5); (d) annual 
personal income before tax under $10,000 (𝑚𝑚6) (binary indicator); (e) annual personal income before 
tax over $120,000 (𝑚𝑚7)  (binary indicator).  Hence, we have 𝐱𝐱 =[ 𝑚𝑚1,𝑚𝑚2, 𝑚𝑚3,𝑚𝑚4,𝑚𝑚5, 𝑚𝑚6,𝑚𝑚7]𝑇𝑇 . The 
summary statistics of these attributes are displayed in Table 3. 
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Table 2. Travel times and probabilities of occurrence 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Early arrival time (hours) 0.631     0.324     0.117     4.583     
Probability of arriving  earlier than expected 0.25 0.11 0.10 0.40 
     
Arrival on time (hours) 0.717     0.358     0.167     4.750     
Probability of arriving at the time expected 0.50 0.15 0.20 0.80 
     
Late arrival time (hours) 0.891 0.453 0.183 6.067 
Probability of arriving later than expected 0.25 0.11 0.10 0.40 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the attributes 
 
Running 
costs (𝑚𝑚1) Toll costs (𝑚𝑚2) Age (𝑚𝑚3) Gender  (𝑚𝑚4) Work hours per week (𝑚𝑚5) Income under $10,000 (𝑚𝑚6) Income over $120,000 (𝑚𝑚7) 
Mean $4.51 $2.10  42.70  0.57 30.75     0.09     0.07    
Std. Dev. $7.48 $1.37 14.96 0.50 18.56     0.29     0.25    
 
In the following analysis, variables 𝑚𝑚3 (age) and 𝑚𝑚5 (work hours per week) were divided by 100 so 
that all the socio-economic factors have a similar magnitude to each other.  
 
5.2.   Model and prior specification  
5.2.1.   Models  
In the following analysis, the value function was chosen as the CRRA utility function (14), 
?̅?𝑣(𝑡𝑡;𝜇𝜇, 𝜏𝜏) = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡1−𝜏𝜏/(1 − 𝜏𝜏) . The generalised linear model for the value function (16), 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 =exp ( 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛), was incorporated, where 𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 is a vector of factors that potentially influenced the value 
function. In the analysis, 𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛  initially included all seven attributes in Table 3 and hence 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛 =[𝛽𝛽1𝑛𝑛, … ,𝛽𝛽7𝑛𝑛]𝑇𝑇. The unified CRWF in equation (12) was used, 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) = 𝑃𝑃1/𝜆𝜆/[𝑃𝑃1/(𝜅𝜅𝜆𝜆) + 𝜔𝜔𝜅𝜅1/𝜆𝜆−1(1 −
𝑃𝑃1/𝜅𝜅)1/𝜆𝜆]𝜅𝜅. The choice probability model was chosen as equation (21): 
 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛,𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛,𝜌𝜌, 𝜅𝜅|𝐱𝐱𝑛𝑛) = exp (−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛(𝜌𝜌)({𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛)]𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 })∑ exp (−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛(𝜌𝜌){{𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐱𝐱𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛+log [∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛)]}𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 )𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛    (23) 
where 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 are the primary outcomes (travel times). Note that as mentioned in the previous sections, we 
have 𝜌𝜌 = 1 − 𝜏𝜏. In addition, the parameter 𝛼𝛼 in (21) is scaled to unity.  Importantly, there is no beta 
coefficient for travel time. This is because the multiplicative model is used here, equivalent to the case 
that each element of 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛 is divided by this coefficient. In addition, we set 𝑚𝑚 = 1 and set 𝑏𝑏 to be the 
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average travel time across all respondents and alternatives so that the analysis was independent of the 
measurement unit of the primary outcome variable. This also allows us to compare more easily with 
the existing risky weighting functions, such as Prelec’s and Goldstein-Einhorn functions. 
Two scenarios were considered: (a) the CRWF with a risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆 common to all 
individuals; and (b) the individual-specific risky weighting functions where each individual traveller 
has his/her own value of risk perception parameter  𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 in order to reflect the individual effect on 
perceptual conditioning. Following Train (2009), we also consider running cost and total cost to be 
random effects in Model (b). More specifically, the two models investigated were:    
• Model (a): The perception parameter is a fixed-effect parameter and  𝑚𝑚1 - 𝑚𝑚7 are all fixed 
effects; Hence, 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 and  𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛 for 𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,734 are all equal respectively, denoted as 𝜆𝜆 and 
𝛃𝛃 = [𝛽𝛽1, … ,𝛽𝛽7]𝑇𝑇; 
• Model (b): The risk perception parameter  𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 is an individual-specific random parameter; the 
coefficients of variables 𝑚𝑚1 and 𝑚𝑚2 are also individual-specific random variables (denoted as 
𝛽𝛽1𝑛𝑛 and 𝛽𝛽2𝑛𝑛). The other five attributes were fixed effects. Hence 𝛃𝛃𝑛𝑛 = [𝛽𝛽1𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽2𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽3, … ,𝛽𝛽7]𝑇𝑇 . 
5.2.2.   Prior specification  
Next, we specify the priors of the parameters in the models. The prior of coefficient 𝜌𝜌 was set as a 
non-informative prior 𝜋𝜋(𝜌𝜌) ∝ 1.  
As mentioned early, when the asymmetry parameter 𝜅𝜅  in (12) is sufficiently large, the risky 
weighting function (12) approaches Prelec’s function (8). In the subsequent analysis, the range of  𝜅𝜅  
for both models was restricted to be (0, 100), and the prior of the asymmetry parameter 𝜅𝜅 was chosen 
to be a uniform distribution on (0, 100). Clearly, any estimate of 𝜅𝜅 close to the upper bound of 100 is 
in favour of Prelec’s weighting function.  
For Model (a), we choose the prior of 𝛃𝛃 to be non-informative, i.e. 𝜋𝜋(𝛃𝛃) ∝ 1. From a practical 
perspective, only a few transformations in the Box-Cox transformation are usually of interest, such as 
square transformation and cubic transformation (see, e.g., Weisberg, 2005). In the analysis we 
restricted the range of 𝜆𝜆 to be less than or equal to 5 in transformation (5). In addition, from Theorem 
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2A, we further restricted 𝜆𝜆 ≥ 1 in the analysis. Hence, the prior of 𝜑𝜑 = log (𝜆𝜆) was set as a uniform 
distribution on [0, log (5)] . This range is usually wide enough to include all the values of the 
perception parameter of practical importance.  
For Model (b), the risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 was treated as a random coefficient. We specified 
the distribution of 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛  as log-normal 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(𝜓𝜓0,𝜎𝜎2)  restricted to interval [1, 5] ; hence, the prior 
distribution of  𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛 = log (𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛) was assumed to be a normal distribution 𝑁𝑁(𝜓𝜓0,𝜎𝜎2) truncated to the 
interval [0, log (5)]. For Model (b), the coefficients of 𝑚𝑚1  and 𝑚𝑚2  were also treated as individual-
specific random variables and were denoted as 𝛽𝛽1𝑛𝑛 and 𝛽𝛽2𝑛𝑛 respectively. For each respondent 𝑛𝑛, we 
specified the distribution of [𝛽𝛽1𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽2𝑛𝑛]𝑇𝑇 as a normal distribution: [𝛽𝛽1𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽2𝑛𝑛]𝑇𝑇~𝑁𝑁([𝜓𝜓1,𝜓𝜓2]𝑇𝑇 ,𝚺𝚺�),         (24) 
where 𝚺𝚺�  is a 2 × 2 covariance matrix of the normal distribution. Let  𝛙𝛙 = [𝜓𝜓0,𝜓𝜓1,𝜓𝜓2]𝑇𝑇 and 𝚺𝚺 be the 
covariance matrix of  𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛  and [𝛽𝛽1𝑛𝑛,𝛽𝛽2𝑛𝑛]𝑇𝑇. Hence, 𝜓𝜓1 and 𝜓𝜓2 are the population means of  𝛽𝛽1𝑛𝑛 and 𝛽𝛽2𝑛𝑛. 
The prior of 𝛙𝛙 and 𝚺𝚺, 𝜋𝜋(𝛙𝛙,𝚺𝚺) = 𝜋𝜋(𝛙𝛙|𝚺𝚺)𝜋𝜋(𝚺𝚺), was taken as non-informative prior:  𝜋𝜋(𝛙𝛙|𝚺𝚺) ∝ 1  and 
𝚺𝚺~𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊(3, 𝐈𝐈) respectively, where  𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊 is an inverse-Wishart distribution. 𝐈𝐈 is a 3 × 3 identity matrix. In 
addition, we chose a non-informative prior for 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗, 𝜋𝜋(𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗) ∝ 1 (j=3,…,7). See Train (2009) for further 
discussion on prior specification.  
The total number of iterations of the MCMC was chosen as 10000, among which the first 5000 
iterations were treated as the burn-in period and the draws in this period were discarded. The results 
reported below were based on the rest of the 5000 draws. The posterior means were used as the 
estimates of the parameters.  
 
5.3.   Results 
Table 4 displays the main empirical results. We first consider Model (a). It can be seen from Table 
4 that the coefficients of all the socio-economic factors, 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 = 3, … ,7), are statistically insignificant 
at the 5% level. Hence, there is no evidence suggesting that these factors influenced the travellers’ 
choice. However, the coefficients associated with the running costs 𝑚𝑚1  and toll costs 𝑚𝑚2  are both 
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significant at the 5% level: ?̂?𝛽1 = 0.591 and ?̂?𝛽2 = 0.667. Hence there is evidence that the running costs 
and toll costs affected the value function of the respondents and hence their choice probabilities.  
Turning to Model (b), we can see that it outperformed Model (a) in terms of the likelihood and 
DIC. Like Model (a), the coefficients of the socio-economic factors in Model (b), 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 = 3, … ,7), are 
insignificant at the 5% level.  
 
Table 4. Estimates of parameters with 95% Bayesian credible intervals  
 coefficient  Model (a) Model (b) Model (c) 
mean log-risk parameter 𝜓𝜓0   0.856 
(0.683, 0.999) 
0.638 
(0.370, 0.949) 
log-risk parameter 𝜑𝜑  0.762 
(0.244, 1.376) 
  
mean running cost effect 𝜓𝜓1    0.733 
(0.651, 0.822) 
0.730 
(0.629, 0.834) 
mean toll cost effect 𝜓𝜓2    0.771 
(0.700, 0.849) 
0.759 
(0.680, 0.846) 
running cost effect 𝛽𝛽1  0.591     
(0.538, 0.637) 
  
toll cost effect 𝛽𝛽2  0.667 
(0.620, 0.702) 
  
Age effect 𝛽𝛽3   -0.050 
(-0.304, 0.234) 
   -0.168 
(-0.378, 0.064) 
-0.224 
(-0.339, -0.105) 
Gender effect 𝛽𝛽4  -0.037 
(-0.226, 0.181) 
    0.001 
(-0.093, 0.094) 
 
work hour per week 𝛽𝛽5  -0.081 
(-0.221, 0.118) 
-0.068 
(-0.300, 0.152) 
 
income under $10,000 𝛽𝛽6  -0.151 
(-0.397, 0.062) 
-0.057 
(-0.250, 0.119) 
 
income over $120,000 𝛽𝛽7  0.017 
(-0.074, 0.109) 
-0.073 
(-0.289, 0.131) 
 
asymmetry parameter 𝜅𝜅  7.371 
(3.776, 10.827) 
7.376 
(4.302,10.112) 
9.328 
(3.206, 15.232) 
risk attitude 𝜏𝜏  0.943 
(0.821, 0.998) 
0.945 
(0.839, 0.999) 
0.948 
(0.843,0.997) 
Log-likelihood   -6628.0 -5625.3 -5645.7 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶   13228.1 12375.4 12368.9 
Note: 𝜓𝜓𝑗𝑗 is the mean of random coefficient 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛 (j=1,2) and 𝜓𝜓0 is the mean of random coefficient 
𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛 = log (𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛) averaged across all individual travellers 𝑛𝑛 (n=1,…, 734) 
 
For Model (b), the coefficients of running costs 𝑚𝑚1 and toll costs 𝑚𝑚2 for each traveller 𝑛𝑛, 𝛽𝛽1𝑛𝑛 and 
𝛽𝛽2𝑛𝑛 (𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,734), are random variables. From equation (24), 𝜓𝜓1 and 𝜓𝜓2 are the population means 
of the random coefficients  𝛽𝛽1𝑛𝑛 and 𝛽𝛽2𝑛𝑛 across all the individual travellers 𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,734, representing 
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the average effects of the two travel-cost variable (running costs and toll costs). From Table 4, we can 
see that the population means associated with the running costs 𝑚𝑚1 and toll costs 𝑚𝑚2 are significant at 
the 5% level:  𝜓𝜓�1 = 0.733 and 𝜓𝜓�2 = 0.771. In addition, the estimate of the population mean of the log 
of the risk perception parameter is also significant at the 5% level, 𝜓𝜓�0 = 0.856.  
Next, we removed insignificant socio-economic factors, one at a time, from Model (b), resulting in 
a refined model, Model (c). Variable 𝑚𝑚3  (age) became significant after having removed the other 
socio-economic factors, suggesting young and senior travellers have different value functions. The 
lower left graph in Figure 4 displays the posterior distribution of the coefficient 𝛽𝛽3 of variable 𝑚𝑚3 (age).  
The estimated population means of the two travel-cost related random coefficients, i.e., running 
costs and toll costs, are 𝜓𝜓�1 = 0.730 , 𝜓𝜓�2 = 0.759 for Model (c), respectively; both are significant at 
the 5% level. See the upper left and upper right graphs of Figure 4 for the posterior distributions of 𝜓𝜓1 
and 𝜓𝜓2. Noting the negative sign in front of the exponent in equation (23), the positive 𝜓𝜓�1 and 𝜓𝜓�2 
indicate that higher levels of the running costs and toll costs corresponds to lower probability of 
choosing that particular route. 
The estimated covariance matrix of 𝛙𝛙 = [𝜓𝜓0,𝜓𝜓1,𝜓𝜓2]𝑇𝑇 is  
𝚺𝚺� = �      0.123   −0.004 0.008     −0.004    0.308  0.2480.008 0.248    0.403 �. 
It can be seen that the population means of the two travel-cost related random coefficients, 𝜓𝜓1 and 𝜓𝜓2, 
are closely correlated each other with correlation coefficient of 0.704, whereas the relationship 
between  𝜓𝜓0  and  (𝜓𝜓1,𝜓𝜓2)  is much weaker: the correlation coefficients are −0.022  and 0.034  
respectively; both of them are insignificant at the 5% level. IN addition, the estimated 𝜏𝜏 in Model (c) is 
0.948 with a 95% credible interval of (0.843,0.997). 
We now turn to consider the elicited risky weighting function for Model (c). The estimated 
asymmetry parameter is ?̂?𝜅 = 9.328 with 95% Bayesian credible interval of (3.206, 15.232); see the 
lower right graph of Figure 4 for the posterior distribution of  𝜅𝜅. This suggests that for this particular 
case, the elicited CRWF is neither Prelec’s (with 𝜅𝜅 = +∞) nor Goldstein-Einhorn’s (with 𝜅𝜅 = 1)  
function. This demonstrates an advantage of using the unified CRWF (12): rather than use the 
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approaches in the existing studies, e.g., Stott (2005), Hensher et al. (2011) and Rasouli and 
Timmermans (2014), where a number of CRWFs were explored one by one, here we use a data-driven 
approach to choosing a CRWF. 
 
Figure 4. Posterior distributions of 𝜓𝜓1 (upper left), 𝜓𝜓2 (upper right), 𝛽𝛽3 (lower left) and 𝜅𝜅 (lower right). 
 
The average risk perception parameter ?̂?𝜆 = exp�𝜓𝜓�0� = 1.893 is significantly different from 1, 
with a 95% credible interval of (exp(0.370), exp(0.949))=(1.448, 2.583). This piece of evidence about 
the risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆, in conjunction with ?̂?𝜅 = 9.328 with 95% Bayesian credible interval of 
(3.206, 15.232), suggests that the risky weighting function is not the identity function 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) = 𝑃𝑃 in 
(9). Hence, the survey data provides evidence of risky weighting: the respondents indeed transformed 
the given probabilities into their own decision weights when making their choices.  Hence, the 
evidence is in favour of CPT against EUT for this particular study. 
Figure 5 displays the elicited CRWF when 𝜓𝜓0 takes the values of the posterior mean 𝜓𝜓�0 = 0.638, 
and the two end-points of the 95% Bayesian credible interval respectively. It is evident from Figure 5 
that the two CRWFs corresponding to the end-points of the 95% Bayesian credible interval do not 
overlap with the diagonal straight-line; the latter represents the identity function 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) = 𝑃𝑃.  
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The asymmetry of the fixed-point is evident from Figure 5: 𝑃𝑃∗ = 0.387 .  This has great 
implications to risky weighting: when the survival probability 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘≥𝑗𝑗  is large (close to 1), the 
transformed survival probability 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘≥𝑗𝑗  will be substantially lower than the original survival 
probability 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 . As a result, the left-tail decision weight 𝑞𝑞1 = 1 −𝑊𝑊(1 − 𝑝𝑝1) is substantially larger 
than the original left-tail probability 𝑝𝑝1.  
To gain further insight, we consider a concrete example with the mean probabilities of ‘early 
arrival’, ‘arrival on time’, and ‘late arrival’ events in Table 2, i.e. 𝑝𝑝1 = 0.25, 𝑝𝑝2 = 0.50, and 𝑝𝑝3 =0.25 respectively. With the average risk perception parameter ?̂?𝜆 = exp�𝜓𝜓�0� = 1.893, the obtained 
CRWF transforms these three probabilities to 𝑞𝑞1 = 0.44 , 𝑞𝑞2 = 0.29  and 𝑞𝑞3 = 0.27  respectively. 
Hence, the risky weighting in this analysis substantially overestimated the left-tail probability (from 
𝑝𝑝1 = 0.25 to 𝑞𝑞1 = 0.44), whereas it kept the right-tail probability almost the unchanged: 𝑝𝑝3 = 0.25 
compared to 𝑞𝑞3 = 0.27. This seems to indicate that the respondents tended to be more optimistic about 
the required travel time than what was shown in the survey questionnaire.  
 
Figure 5. Elicited unified CRWF in (12) scaled to 𝑏𝑏 = 1 with risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆 equal to the 
posterior mean exp(0.638) (), and equal to the two end-points of the 95% Bayesian credible interval, 
i.e. exp(0.370) (− −), and exp(0.949) (− ⋅ − ⋅) respectively. 
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Figure 6. Histogram of the estimated values of the individual-specific risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛  
across the 734 respondents. 
 
To show the variability of the risk perception parameter, Figure 6 displays a histogram of the 
estimated 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛  (𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,734) across the individual travellers. It can be seen that most values of the 
individual-specific risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛  lie within the interval [1.85, 1.95], suggesting a 
transformation close to the square transformation. In addition, it is reinforced by Figure 6 that a 
restriction of 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 on the interval of (0,5] is a reasonable choice; the likelihood that 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 is larger than 5 is 
negligible.  
In summary, the case study in this section provides empirical evidence of risky weighting for 
travellers’ route choices as the empirical results are in favour of CPT relative to EUT. In the existing 
literature, there are some comparisons between CPT and EUT based models (e.g., Gao et al. 2010). 
However, these studies do not address this issue statistically. Secondly, the case study shows that 
neither the Prelec’s risky weighting function nor Goldstein-Einhorn’s function is a suitable choice to 
model risky weighting for the problem considered here; in this case, the developed unified CRWF 
outperforms these specific forms. Again, there are some existing studies that compare the 
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performances of various risky weighting functions (e.g., Hensher et al. 2011). However, without a 
proper statistical model, these studies cannot address this issue formally and statistically. The results 
also suggest that if the researcher only selects risky weighting functions from a few existing forms, the 
results could potentially be biased. Finally, the study also provides evidence that risk perception varies 
from traveller to traveller, supporting the argument in De Palma et al. (2008). Hence, assuming a 
uniform risk perception parameter, like it was done in the existing literature, could be problematic. 
6.   Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have investigated the modelling of decision-makers’ risky weighting and choice 
behaviour when they are facing several risky prospects. We have proposed a broad class of CRWFs 
and investigated some important properties of the CRWFs within the class. On the basis of this, we 
have developed a unified CRWF that includes several important CRWFs in the literature as special 
cases. We have also shown that in practice, the choice for CRWFs within this class comes down to the 
selection of the asymmetry parameter 𝜅𝜅. In addition, the asymmetry parameter 𝜅𝜅, together with the 
individual risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 , can be used to test about CPT against EUT, and hence 
provides empirical evidence about decision-makers’ risky weighting.  
We have developed a multivariate method for discrete choice analysis with risky prospects to 
account for decision-makers’ individual-specific risk perception and the impact of various factors on 
decision making. Individual-specific risk perception makes much more practical sense than a common 
risk perception parameter because in reality people’s risk perception does vary from person to person. 
The multivariate method also provides an approach to a better understanding about how decision-
makers form their value function.  
The research in this paper can be extended to accommodate more complicated problems. We 
outline a couple potential future research directions below. First, it is well documented in the literature 
that individuals’ risk perception could be affected by some common psychological factors and social 
factors (see, e.g., Fox and Tversky 1998; Weber and Hsee, 1998; Sjöberg, 2000; Braisby and Gellatly, 
2012; among many others). An important extension of the research in this paper is to link the 
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individual risk perception parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛  to a number of psychological and social covariates, i.e. 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = exp (𝛄𝛄𝑇𝑇𝐳𝐳𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛) , where 𝐳𝐳𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛  is a vector of covariates and 𝛄𝛄  is the vector of the corresponding 
coefficients. The modelling of risk perception parameter will give us an opportunity to investigate the 
impact of various psychological and social factors on risky weighting.  
Secondly, we have focused on the multiplicative model, equation (13), where the link function is 
weibit and the underlying distribution of the stochastic part is the Weibull distribution. Li (2011) 
developed a large class of link functions where the underlying distribution does not have to be the 
Weibull distribution. Importantly, this model class includes both the additive model and multiplicative 
model as special cases. Clearly, extensions can be made to substantially relax the assumption of the 
multiplicative model used in this paper.  
Finally, similar to the multinomial logit model, the scale parameter 𝛼𝛼 in models (22) and (23) is 
assumed to be the same for all decision-makers and all alternatives throughout this paper. In some 
applications, this may not be realistic. The issue of scale heterogeneity across individuals has been 
investigated in the literature (see, e.g., Greene and Hensher, 2010). Following these existing studies, 
the method developed in this paper can be extended accordingly. 
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Appendix A. Proofs of the theorems   
Proof of Theorem 1. The result in (i) follows by noting that 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) = Pr(𝑆𝑆 > 𝑡𝑡) = Pr(𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) > 𝑡𝑡) =Pr(𝑇𝑇 > 𝐻𝐻−1(𝑡𝑡)) = 𝐹𝐹(𝐻𝐻−1(𝑡𝑡))  and hence 𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) = 𝐺𝐺−1[𝐹𝐹(𝑇𝑇)] . Substituting 𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐹𝐹(𝐻𝐻−1(𝑡𝑡))  into 
𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)=𝐺𝐺[𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)] yields 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)=𝐹𝐹(𝐻𝐻−1[𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)]). This completes the proof.  
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Proof of Theorem 2A.  (i) The results of  𝑊𝑊(0) = 0 and 𝑊𝑊(1) = 1 are immediate from the fact that  
𝐹𝐹(0) = 1  and 𝐹𝐹(+∞) = 0 . In addition, since 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡)  is a decreasing function, we have 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃1) ≥
𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃2)  for any 𝑃𝑃1 < 𝑃𝑃2 . We further have {𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃1)}1/𝜆𝜆 ≥ {𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃2)}1/𝜆𝜆 . This implies that  
𝐹𝐹({𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃1)}1/𝜆𝜆) ≤ 𝐹𝐹({𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃2)}1/𝜆𝜆), i.e. 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃1) ≤  𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃2). Hence, 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) is an increasing function.  
(ii) Because survival function  𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) is a decreasing function, we obtain 
𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) ≤ 𝑃𝑃   if and only if   {𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆 ≥ 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃). 
Hence, we have either  𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃) = 0  or 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃) ≤ 1  since 𝜆𝜆 > 1  and 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃) ≥ 0  (note that the 
domain of  𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) is ℜ+). From  𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃) ≤ 1 we obtain 𝑃𝑃 ≥ 𝐹𝐹(1) = 𝑃𝑃∗. Similarly, we can show that 
𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) ≥ 𝑃𝑃 if 𝑃𝑃 ≤ 𝑃𝑃∗.  Due to the continuity of 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃), there exists a fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝐹𝐹(1)  satisfying 
𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃∗). Furthermore, if 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) is a strictly decreasing function, then we have {𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃∗)}1/𝜆𝜆 =
𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃∗) from  𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃∗). For 𝜆𝜆 > 1, the equation 𝑚𝑚1/𝜆𝜆 − 𝑚𝑚 = 0 has a unique real root of 1 on 
interval (0, +∞). Hence, 𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝐹𝐹(1) is the unique fixed-point if 0 < 𝐹𝐹(1) < 1. 
(iii) For any 1 ≤ 𝜆𝜆1 ≤ 𝜆𝜆2, we have {𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆1 ≥ {𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆2 if 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃) ≥ 1. Noting that 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) is 
a decreasing function, we obtain that 𝐹𝐹({𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆1) ≤ 𝐹𝐹({𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆2)  if 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃) ≥ 1 , i.e., 
𝑃𝑃 ≤ 𝐹𝐹(1) = 𝑃𝑃∗ . Hence, for all 𝜆𝜆 ≥ 1 , 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) is an increasing function of  𝜆𝜆  if 𝑃𝑃 ≤ 𝑃𝑃∗ . The final 
conclusion in (iii) is immediate from the fact that 𝑞𝑞1 = 𝑝𝑝1 and 𝑞𝑞𝐽𝐽 = 𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽 when 𝜆𝜆 = 1.  
(iv) It follows immediately by noting {𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆 approaches to 1 for any 𝑃𝑃 ∈ (0, 1) as 𝜆𝜆 becomes 
sufficiently large. This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Theorem 2B.  The proof of (i) is the same as Theorem 2A (i).  
(ii) Clearly 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) ≤ 𝑃𝑃   if and only if   {𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆 ≥ 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃). Hence, we have either  𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃) = 0 
or 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃) ≥ 1 since 𝜆𝜆 < 1. This implies 𝑃𝑃 ≤ 𝐹𝐹(1) = 𝑃𝑃∗ . The remaining part is the similar to the 
counterpart of Theorem 2A(ii).  
(iii) The proof that 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) is an increasing function of  𝜆𝜆 for all 0 < 𝜆𝜆 ≤ 1 is the same as that of 
Theorem 2A (iii). The conclusion in (iii) is immediate as 𝑞𝑞1 = 𝑝𝑝1 and 𝑞𝑞𝐽𝐽 = 𝑝𝑝𝐽𝐽 when 𝜆𝜆 = 1.  
(iv) As 𝜆𝜆  becomes sufficiently small,  {𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆  approaches to 0 (or +∞)  if 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃) < 1  (or 
𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃) > 1). Hence 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) = 𝐹𝐹({𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃)}1/𝜆𝜆) approaches to 1 (or 0) if 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃) < 1 (or 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃) > 1). 
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This indicates that decision weights 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 = 𝑊𝑊�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗� −𝑊𝑊�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗+1� = 0  if 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗+1 > 𝑃𝑃∗  or 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 < 𝑃𝑃∗ . Hence, 
there exists an index 𝑗𝑗0 such that 𝑊𝑊�𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗0� = 1 and �𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗0+1� = 0 , i.e.  𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗0 = 1. 
 
Proof of Theorem 3.  
(i) Since 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡;𝜅𝜅) is a strictly decreasing function of 𝑡𝑡, the fixed-point  𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝐹𝐹(1;𝜅𝜅) = 1/[1 + 1/ 𝜅𝜅]𝜅𝜅 
given in Theorems 2A and 2B is unique.  In addition, because 1/[1 + 1/ 𝜅𝜅]𝜅𝜅 is monotonic in 𝜅𝜅, we 
have 𝑒𝑒−1 ≤ 𝐹𝐹(1; 𝜅𝜅) ≤ 0.5  for any 𝜅𝜅 ∈ (1, +∞). The proof of (iii) is similar and proof of (ii) is trivial.  
(iv) It is easy to verify that  
 𝜕𝜕2𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)/𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃2 = 𝜆𝜆−2𝜅𝜅−1{1 + 𝜅𝜅−1[𝜅𝜅 �𝑃𝑃−1𝜅𝜅 − 1�]1𝜆𝜆}−𝜅𝜅−2[𝜅𝜅 �𝑃𝑃−1𝜅𝜅 − 1�]1𝜆𝜆−2𝑃𝑃−1𝜅𝜅−2𝐽𝐽(𝑃𝑃), 
where 
 𝐽𝐽(𝑃𝑃) = [𝜅𝜅 �𝑃𝑃−1𝜅𝜅 − 1�]1𝜆𝜆 �(𝜅𝜅 + 𝜆𝜆)𝑃𝑃−1𝜅𝜅 − 𝜆𝜆(𝜅𝜅 + 1) �𝑃𝑃−1𝜅𝜅 − 1�� + 𝜅𝜅(𝜆𝜆 − 1)𝑃𝑃−1𝜅𝜅 − 𝜆𝜆𝜅𝜅(𝜅𝜅 + 1) �𝑃𝑃−1𝜅𝜅 − 1� . 
It is straightforward to verify that 𝐽𝐽(𝑃𝑃∗) = 0 and hence 𝜕𝜕2𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃)/𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃2 = 0 at 𝑃𝑃∗ . Therefore, 𝑃𝑃∗ is an 
inflection point of 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) for 𝑃𝑃 ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, we have  𝐽𝐽(1) = 𝜅𝜅(𝜆𝜆 − 1) > 0 and 𝐽𝐽(0) → −∞. 
Finally, by some algebra it can be shown that 𝐽𝐽(𝑃𝑃) is a strictly increasing function of 𝑃𝑃. Therefore 𝑃𝑃∗ 
is the unique root of 𝐽𝐽(𝑃𝑃) on [0, 1], and hence it is the unique inflection point of 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃) on [0, 1].  
(v) The proof is similar to that of (iv).  
 
Proof of Corollary.  
By definition, the fixed-point 𝑃𝑃∗ satisfies 𝑊𝑊(𝑃𝑃∗) = 𝑃𝑃∗, i.e.   {𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃∗;𝜅𝜅)}1𝜆𝜆/𝑚𝑚 = 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃∗;𝜅𝜅). Hence, 
we obtain 𝐹𝐹−1(𝑃𝑃∗;𝜅𝜅) = 𝑚𝑚𝜆𝜆/(𝜆𝜆−1)  or equivalently 𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝐹𝐹�𝑚𝑚𝜆𝜆/(𝜆𝜆−1);𝜅𝜅�. From the proof of Theorem 3,  1/[1 + 1/ 𝜅𝜅]𝜅𝜅 is monotonic in 𝜅𝜅. Hence, we obtain 𝐹𝐹�𝑚𝑚𝜆𝜆/(𝜆𝜆−1); +∞� ≤ 𝑃𝑃∗ ≤ 𝐹𝐹�𝑚𝑚𝜆𝜆/(𝜆𝜆−1); 1�  for any 
𝜅𝜅 ∈ (1, +∞). When 𝜆𝜆 > 1 and 𝑚𝑚 > 1, we have  𝑚𝑚𝜆𝜆/(𝜆𝜆−1) > 1. Hence 𝐹𝐹�𝑚𝑚𝜆𝜆/(𝜆𝜆−1); +∞�  approaches 0 
as 𝑚𝑚𝜆𝜆/(𝜆𝜆−1)  becomes large. In addition, 𝐹𝐹�𝑚𝑚𝜆𝜆/(𝜆𝜆−1); 1�  approaches 𝐹𝐹(1; 1) = 0.5  as 𝑚𝑚𝜆𝜆/(𝜆𝜆−1) 
approaches 1. Hence, we obtain 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃∗ ≤ 0.5.  
 
Appendix B. The maximum-entropy principle 
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The maximum entropy principle is widely incorporated in the literature for statistical inference 
with limited prior knowledge; see Golan et al. (1996) for a general review, and Park and Bera (2009) 
for an example in econometric modelling. In Bayesian analysis, it is also used to work out prior 
probability measures (see, e.g.,, Gelman et al., 2009). Here we consider the problem of choosing an 
underlying survival function 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) with very limited information in a choice experiment. 
Specifically, we wish to find a probability density function 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡|𝜂𝜂)  for the primary outcome 
variable  𝑇𝑇 ∈ ℜ+  with the mean parameter 𝜂𝜂. When the mean 𝜂𝜂  is fully specified, it is well known 
that the maximum entropy distribution is the exponential distribution𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡|𝜂𝜂) = 𝜂𝜂−1 exp(−𝑡𝑡/𝜂𝜂) (see, 
e.g., Golan et al., 1996; Park and Bera, 2009). Now we consider the problem from a Bayesian 
perspective and assume that the mean of the underlying distribution 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡|𝜂𝜂) is not completely specified; 
rather, it is subject to random variation and it follows a prior distribution 𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂) which is also unknown 
but some information about 𝜂𝜂 is available and is expressed as the moment conditions. Consequently, 
the objective is to find the joint distribution 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡|𝜂𝜂)𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂)  from the maximum entropy 
principle. The following lemma shows that under some conditions, we can determine a joint 
distribution 𝑔𝑔∗(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡|𝜂𝜂)𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂) from the maximum entropy principle, upon which the marginal 
probability density function of  𝑇𝑇 ∈ ℜ+  can be obtained: 𝑓𝑓∗(𝑡𝑡) = ∫𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡|𝜂𝜂)𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 , and hence the 
underlying survival function is chosen as 𝐹𝐹∗(𝑡𝑡) = ∫ 𝑓𝑓∗(𝑚𝑚)𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚+∞𝑡𝑡 . 
 
Lemma. Consider the entropy 𝐼𝐼 = −∬𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂) log[𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂)]𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂  for a joint continuous probability 
density function 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡|𝜂𝜂)𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂), where 𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂) is the marginal density function of 𝜂𝜂 and 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡|𝜂𝜂) is 
the density function of 𝑇𝑇 ∈ ℜ+  conditional on 𝜂𝜂.  Then for any 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂) on ℜ+ × ℜ+, the solution that  
maximises    𝐼𝐼 = −∬𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂) log[𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂)]𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂        (A1) 
subject to:  ∬𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 = 1                   (A2) 
     ∫ 𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡|𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 = 𝜂𝜂 < +∞                  (A3) 
                  ∫ log(𝜂𝜂−1)𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 = 𝑟𝑟1 < +∞                 (A4) 
                  ∫𝜂𝜂−1𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 = 𝑟𝑟2 < +∞                   (A5) 
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is given by 𝑔𝑔∗(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂) = 𝑐𝑐0𝜂𝜂−𝜔𝜔1exp [−(𝑡𝑡 + 𝜔𝜔2)/𝜂𝜂] with 𝑐𝑐0 > 0 the normalisation constant, and 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 > 0 
( 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 ) are two constant values. The marginal survival distribution of 𝑇𝑇 ∈ ℜ+   is 𝐹𝐹∗(𝑡𝑡) =
∫ [∫ 𝑔𝑔(𝑚𝑚, 𝜂𝜂)+∞0 𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂]𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚+∞𝑡𝑡 = 1/[1 + 𝑡𝑡/𝜔𝜔2 ]𝜔𝜔1. 
Proof . We form the Lagrangian function as 
𝐿𝐿 = −�𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂) log[𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂)]𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 + 𝜔𝜔0 � 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 − 1� 
     +𝜔𝜔1[∬ log(𝜂𝜂−1)𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 − 𝑟𝑟1] + 𝜔𝜔2[𝑟𝑟2 −∬𝜂𝜂−1𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂]+[∬𝜔𝜔3(𝜂𝜂)(𝜂𝜂 − 𝑡𝑡)𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂], 
where 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 = 0,1,2,3) are the Lagrange multipliers. By using the calculus of variations, the optimal 
condition is the Euler equation given by 
−log[𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂)] − 1 + 𝜔𝜔0 +𝜔𝜔1log(𝜂𝜂−1) −𝜔𝜔2𝜂𝜂−1 + 𝜔𝜔3(𝜂𝜂)(𝜂𝜂 − 𝑡𝑡) = 0. 
Solving the above equation together with the constraints (A2)-(A5), we obtain 
𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂) = exp (𝜔𝜔0 − 1)𝜂𝜂−𝜔𝜔1exp {−𝜔𝜔2𝜂𝜂−1 + 𝜔𝜔3(𝜂𝜂)(𝜂𝜂 − 𝑡𝑡)}.    (A6) 
Integrating out 𝑡𝑡, we obtain the marginal density function of 𝜂𝜂: 
𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂) = ∫𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 = exp (𝜔𝜔0 − 1)𝜂𝜂−𝜔𝜔1exp {−𝜔𝜔2𝜂𝜂−1 + 𝜔𝜔3(𝜂𝜂)𝜂𝜂}/𝜔𝜔3(𝜂𝜂).               (A7) 
Hence, the distribution of 𝑇𝑇 conditional on 𝜂𝜂 is 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡|𝜂𝜂) = 𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂)/𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂) = 𝜔𝜔3(𝜂𝜂)exp {−𝜔𝜔3(𝜂𝜂)𝑡𝑡}. From 
(A3), we conclude that 𝜔𝜔3(𝜂𝜂) = 1/𝜂𝜂, and hence 
𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡|𝜂𝜂) = 𝜂𝜂−1exp {−𝑡𝑡/𝜂𝜂}.        (A8) 
Consequently, 𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂) in (A7) becomes 𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂) = exp (𝜔𝜔0)𝜂𝜂−𝜔𝜔1exp {−𝜔𝜔2𝜂𝜂−1}. To ensure the convergence 
of the integrals in (A4) and (A5), both 𝜔𝜔1 and 𝜔𝜔2 must be positive. Therefore,  𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂) in (A6) reduces 
to 𝑔𝑔∗(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂) = 𝑐𝑐0𝜂𝜂−𝜔𝜔1exp {−(𝜔𝜔2 + 𝑡𝑡)𝜂𝜂−1}, where 𝑐𝑐0 = exp (𝜔𝜔0) is constant. Finally, integrating out 𝜂𝜂, 
we obtain the marginal density function of 𝑇𝑇 ∈ ℜ+: 
𝑓𝑓∗(𝑡𝑡) = ∫𝑔𝑔∗(𝑡𝑡, 𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 = ∫ 𝑐𝑐0𝜂𝜂−𝜔𝜔1exp {−(𝜔𝜔2 + 𝑡𝑡)𝜂𝜂−1}𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 = 𝜔𝜔2−1(1 + 𝑡𝑡/𝜔𝜔2)−𝜔𝜔1−1. 
Hence, the underlying survival function is 𝐹𝐹∗(𝑡𝑡) = (1 + 𝑡𝑡/𝜔𝜔2)−𝜔𝜔1. This completes the proof. 
 
We note that constraint (A2) in the lemma is simply the normalisation condition. Constraint (A3) 
ensures that the mean of 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡|𝜂𝜂) exists and is equal to 𝜂𝜂. The mean 𝜂𝜂 here is not assumed to be fully 
specified; rather, it follows an unknown distribution 𝜋𝜋(𝜂𝜂). The information about 𝜂𝜂 is expressed by the 
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two moment conditions, i.e. (A4) and (A5). Constraints (A4) and (A5) are commonly used in the 
literature to derive (inverse) gamma distributions via the maximum entropy principle (Kagan, et al., 
1973; Park and Bera, 2009).  
The result in the lemma shows that when eliciting prior knowledge with limited information, the 
distribution (11) is the optimal underlying survival function in the sense of the maximum entropy.  
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